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Abstract
The divergence of unemployment rates between the United States and Europe
coincided with a substantial acceleration in capital-embodied technical change in
the late 1970s. Evidence suggests that European economies have lagged behind the
United States in the adoption and usage of new technologies. This paper argues that
the obsolescence of an economy’s technological capital is a key determinant for the
way the economy’s labor market reacts to an acceleration in capital-embodied tech-
nical change. The proposed framework offers a novel explanation for the observed
divergence of unemployment rates across economies that are hit by the very same
shock (i.e. the acceleration in embodied technical change) but differ in their tech-
nology adoption. The results of the paper challenge the popular, but controversial,
view that blames generous unemployment insurance for high unemployment in Eu-
rope. The analysis shows that the observed institutional heterogeneity is insufficient
to explain the diverse evolution of unemployment rates
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1 Introduction
After low levels of unemployment in Europe prior to the late 1970s, European unemploy-
ment became high relative to that in the United States. Labor markets in Europe began
to deteriorate at a time when there was a substantial acceleration in the arrival of new
technologies, as measured by capital-embodied technical change. Documented by Gor-
don’s (1990) influential work on the quality-adjusted price of capital, and, more recently,
by Cummins and Violante (2002), the rate of change in the relative price of new capital
investments in the U.S. has substantially increased in magnitude, from -2% before the
mid-1970s to -4.5% in the 1990s, suggesting an acceleration in capital-embodied technical
change. There is convincing empirical evidence, provided by Oliner and Sichel (2000),
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and van Ark et al. (2002), among others, indicating that
certain economies in Europe have lagged behind the United States (and other European
economies) in the adoption and usage of new technologies. This delay is reflected by a per-
sistent growth and technology gap of these countries, as measured by labor productivity
growth, the share of information and communication technologies (ICT) in investment and
its contribution to output growth. This paper argues that the coexistence of a technology
gap, resulting from slack technology adoption, and the divergence of unemployment rates
across economies is not coincidental. Rather, the degree of obsolescence of an economy’s
technological capital is a key determinant for how the economy’s labor market reacts to
an acceleration in capital-embodied technical change.
The quantitative part of the paper uses a calibrated labor market matching model
to study the implications of the increase in the rate of embodied technical change after
the 1970s for OECD labor markets. The main result is that the observed cross-country
differences in technology adoption and usage can account for a large part of the differ-
ent evolutions of OECD unemployment rates since the 1970s. Countries with sizable
technology gaps are predicted to experience a severe deterioration of labor market out-
comes, unlike countries with high technology usage in which unemployment rates rise
only slightly. In contrast to previous work, the framework proposed here can explain
(a) the divergence of unemployment rates between the major European countries and the
United States and (b) a large part of the observed variation in unemployment rates across
OECD economies. The technological heterogeneity across countries is found to be central
for explaining cross-country differences in labor market outcomes. This result challenges
the popular, but controversial, hypothesis that blames generous unemployment benefits
for high unemployment in Europe.1 The analysis shows that the observed institutional
heterogeneity is insufficient to explain the diverse evolution of OECD unemployment
1The controversy comes from the fact that the institutions that are held responsible were also present
in the 1960s, yet in the 1960s unemployment was much higher in the United States than in Europe, see
e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
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rates. Moreover, many European welfare-state economies with generous unemployment
insurance systems have successfully maintained low rates of unemployment. All of these
economies have also had high technology adoption rates.
The analysis in this paper is based on the labor market matching framework pro-
posed by Mortensen and Pissarides (1998). The standard model is augmented with an
endogenous technology choice by firms. It assumes that individuals to possess human
capital that is specific to the technology they use. A technology frontier characterizes the
state-of-the art technology that is available to all firms at a given point in time. Constant
productivity growth at the frontier renders all existing technologies gradually obsolete.
Hence, at a certain point, it is optimal for a firm to scrap its current technology and adopt
a new one or to destroy the job. The skills of the employed worker are vintage-specific.
Therefore, the adoption of a new technology by a firm leads to a skill mismatch with the
employed worker because the new technology requires different skills. The firm can over-
come this mismatch by re-training the worker, which is assumed to be costly. Moreover,
the costs of re-training are assumed to increase with the technological distance between
the firm’s current technology and the new technology that is installed. The same type of
skill mismatch occurs when a firm hires a new worker from unemployment, and the skills
of the worker are obsolete and do not fit to the firm’s technology. We speak of skill obso-
lescence when the human capital of a worker fits a technology that is less advanced than
the firm’s current technology. Re-training expenses for a newly employed worker diminish
a firm’s surplus of creating a new job. Therefore, the obsolescence of the unemployed
workers’ skills is an important determinant of aggregate labor market outcomes because
it determines the firms’ expected costs of hiring and training a new employee and thereby
affects the equilibrium number of jobs.
The first part of the paper studies the effects of a rise in the rate of embodied technical
change on firms’ technology choice, workers’ skills and aggregate labor market variables.
The analysis in this section is conducted within a tractable framework that allows for an
analytical characterization of the main mechanisms at work. All of the insights generated
in this analysis carry over to the quantitative model and contribute to interpretation of
the results of the quantitative analysis. An acceleration in embodied technical change,
such as that observed in the mid-1970s, affects aggregate labor market outcomes via three
effects: an obsolescence effect, a capitalization effect and a cost effect. In response to faster
technical change, firms allow for a larger critical technology gap. That is, firms allow their
technologies to become more obsolete before replacing them. The greater technological
obsolescence translates to a lower value of a job because the firm foregoes part of the
higher productivity growth at the frontier. A lower job value discourages job creation and
raises unemployment. This is the essence of the obsolescence effect. The capitalization
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effect is commonly found in vintage technology models. Higher growth lowers the firm’s
discount rate, at which it capitalizes expected future income emerging from the current
technology and any future upgrading. Thus, future profits are discounted at a lower rate,
leading to an increase in the discounted stream of future profits and a rise in the value of
the job which, in turn, promotes job creation and lowers unemployment.
The cost effect is related to the human capital obsolescence of the unemployed. When new
technologies arrive at an increased pace, the skills of the unemployed deteriorate more
rapidly relative to the frontier knowledge. Furthermore, firms that allow for a larger criti-
cal technology gap imply that employed individuals work, on average, with more outdated
technologies. When these workers eventually separate from their jobs and enter unem-
ployment, their skills are more obsolete. Both of these factors lead to a deterioration of
the average skills of the unemployed, suggesting that in times of faster technical change,
it becomes more costly for a firm to hire and re-train a new employee. The increase in
costs reduces the firms’ incentives to create new jobs and tends to increase unemployment.
The negative cost and obsolescence effects are found to be relatively mild in economies
in which firms have a high technology adoption rate and stay close to the technology fron-
tier. By contrast, in economies where technology updating is slack, both of the effects are
strong, and therefore the increase in unemployment in these countries is more pronounced.
The second part of the paper performs a quantitative analysis of a cross-section of 23
OECD countries. The labor market model is calibrated to match the observed technology
gap (relative to the United States) for each country. The quantitative model is then used
to simulate the 1970s increase in the rate of embodied technical change. Based on this
simulation, we can assess the extent to which the model can match the observed change
in labor market variables and other macroeconomic outcomes for each country. Various
robustness checks are considered to test the sensitivity of the model results to some of
the underlying assumptions. The proposed framework accounts remarkably well for the
observed cross-country patterns of the rate and the duration of unemployment and labor
productivity growth. The technological heterogeneity reflected by cross-country differ-
ences in technology updating is a key element in explaining the observed cross-country
differences in various economic outcomes. By contrast, institutional factors, such as the
unemployment insurance system, are quantitatively of much lesser importance.
The European unemployment experience has attracted a great deal of attention in
recent years. Economists have offered numerous explanations for the emergence of high
European unemployment in the late 1970s, including overly generous welfare systems,
slow TFP growth and capital market imperfections2. One particularly influential strand
2See Nickell (2003) for a recent survey of research on the issue of European unemployment. Blanchard
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in the literature emphasizes the interaction of macoeconomic shocks and labor market
institutions as the main driving force for high levels of European unemployment. Key
references include Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2007), Marimon and Zilibotti (1999)
and Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007). The framework proposed by Ljungqvist and
Sargent (1998) is the first rigorous attempt to study the shock-policy interaction within
a calibrated model. A related explanation is offered by Marimon and Zilibotti (1999).
The line of argument proposed by these authors is as follows. European unemployment
increased due to reduced incentives for workers to exit unemployment. Workers in Eu-
rope prefer to collect generous unemployment benefits rather than to work for a low
wage. Wages are low because the technology shock has made workers’ skills obsolete, as
in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), or has made it increasingly difficult to match workers
with existing vacancies, as in Marimon and Zilibotti (1999). The mechanism in these
papers operates primarily through the labor supply side. Ljungqvist and Sargent’s (2007)
study is a refinement that considers a matching framework in which firms adjust labor
demand in the aftermath of the shock. The shock considered in Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1998, 2007) refers to a general change in the economic environment and is described by
an increased degree of economic turbulence.
Recently, a number of economists have emphasized the potential significance of embod-
ied technical change to explain the differences in labor market outcomes across countries.
Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007) was the first work to highlight the interaction be-
tween shocks to capital-embodied technical change and labor market institutions. In their
model, an increase in embodied technical change, such as that observed in the mid-1970s,
leads to a sharp reduction in firms’ labor demand in a (European-type) welfare state
economy, whereas it has only mild effects on labor demand in a (U.S.-type) laissez-faire
economy. Consequently, unemployment rises by much more in the welfare state.
Much of the work so far on the subject has focused on mechanisms that can success-
fully reproduce the evolution of an average European unemployment rate but typically fail
to account for the large heterogeneity of unemployment rates across European countries.
In fact, Blanchard (2005) suggests that discussing ”European unemployment” is mislead-
ing because high average European unemployment reflects high unemployment in four
large continental countries (Germany, Italy, Spain and France), whereas unemployment
is low (and comparable to the U.S. rate) in many other European countries. Arguably,
a theory that addresses the European unemployment experience but fails to explain the
large heterogeneity of labor market outcomes across European economies conflicts with
an essential aspect of actuality and is likely to disregard relevant factors.
(2005) is an excellent assessment of the state of the contemporary literature regarding the European
unemployment question.
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The underlying determinants for the observed divergence are unlikely to be labor mar-
ket institutions. Although changes in labor market institutions can account for some of
the rise in European unemployment, as shown by Nickell et al. (2005), a sizable fraction
remains unexplained. Hagedorn et al. (2010) propose a framework in which changes in
taxes on labor income and sales affect productivity and drive unemployment. They do
not report how much of the diverse unemployment evolution their model can explain, but
it is unlikely to be quantitatively substantial. This is because, as reported by McDaniel
(2007, 2011), labor income taxes in the OECD have been rising gradually from the 1960s
to the 2000s. The increase was uniform across countries, so the dispersion of labor in-
come taxes in 1975 is about the same as the dispersion after the 1990s. Even if labor
taxes affect unemployment, it is difficult to reconcile the observed gradual and uniform
rise in taxes with the sharp rise of unemployment after the 1970s and the heterogeneous
unemployment response across countries.
This paper emphasizes a new dimension of cross-country heterogeneity, namely techno-
logical heterogeneity, which has not been considered in the literature thus far but is an
important explanatory factor for the observed evolution of OECD unemployment3. The
framework of this paper paper provides a microstructure for the turbulence approach pro-
posed by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). According to their view, rising unemployment
can be explained by a higher degree of economic turbulence after the 1970s. Turbulence is
modeled as an ad-hoc increase in the likelihood that workers will loose a fraction of their
skills in the event of a job loss. In this paper, by contrast, the degree of skill obsolescence
is endogenously determined and driven by firms’ technology choice. Thus, this paper
provides an explicit rationale for higher turbulence by directly linking increased human
capital obsolescence to the observed post-1970 rise in embodied technical change.
Several authors have recently noted that, since the late 1950s, total hours worked per
person in Europe have declined relative to the hours worked in the United States. The
total amount of hours worked and the unemployment rate are naturally related to each
other in an economy because changes in total hours worked per person can be decomposed
into changes in the intensive margin (hours per worker) and the extensive margin of labor
(employment rate). Therefore, the question emerges whether the literature that considers
the evolution of hours worked can shed light on the observed divergence of unemploy-
ment rates between Europe and the United States. If so, these studies would arguably be
competing with the explanation offered in this paper. This is an important matter and
Section 2 addresses it through a brief discussion.
3It is not the aim of the paper to explain why this heterogeneity exists in the first place, that is why
several countries in Europe have been lagging behind the United States in the implementation and usage
of new technologies. Rather, the paper takes the observed differences in technology updating as given
and evaluates their effects on labor market and other macroeconomic outcomes.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical
facts that motivate the analysis in this paper. Section 3 introduces the theoretical frame-
work and Section 4 analyzes analytically the main channels between technology updating
and labor market outcomes. Section 5 presents the quantitative analysis. This section
contains an explanation of the parameterization and calibration of the model and a dis-
cussion of the cross-country analysis. Section 6 considers various robustness checks of the
model’s results. Section 7 concludes and an appendix contains supplementary materials.
2 The Facts
Observation 1: Divergence of OECD Unemployment Rates in the 1980s
In the postwar period prior to the late 1970s, unemployment in Europe was low relative
to unemployment in the United States. The graph in Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows that
during the entire period prior to the 1980s, unemployment in the United States was signif-
icantly higher than in Europe4. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the average unemployment
rate in Europea was approximately 2.5%, whereas the U.S. figure was approximately
5%. This situation changed substantially after the mid-1970s. Unemployment in Eu-
rope experienced a sharp and persistent increase, up to approximately 9%, whereas U.S.
unemployment rose by much less.
This rise in Europe, however, was not homogenous across economies. Panel (b) of the
same figure shows that until the late 1970s, unemployment rates were fairly uniform across
European countries. In the early 1980s, unemployment rates began to diverge because in
some countries the increase was much less pronounced than in others. The graph labeled
EU-2 represents the group-average unemployment rate for Austria, Denmark, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Unemployment for
this group is similar to the U.S. figure. More importantly, the rise in unemployment was
much less pronounced than in the group labeled EU-1, which represents the group-average
unemployment rate for Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy and
Spain5. As a result, the dispersion of unemployment rates across European countries
increased substantially. The standard deviation more than doubled, from a value of 1.77
during 1956-1974 to 4.48 during 1980-2000.
4The data for the unemployment rate and the duration of unemployment is obtained from the OCED
Annual Labour Force Statistics database.
5The categorization of countries into EU-1 and EU-2 will be maintained throughout the paper. The
following two criteria served as the basis for selecting countries: (1) a 1980-2007 average unemployment
rate of above 8% and (2) a percentage points change in 1980-2007 unemployment with respect to the
long-run average of more than 2.5 percentage points. All countries which fulfill at least one of the two
criteria are placed in the group EU-1, all others are in EU-2. Average unemployment rates are obtained
by weighting the unemployment rate of each group member by the population share.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: Average annual unemployment, in %, by subperiod for the United States and the
EU-15, and for the group EU-1 (B, FIN, F, GER, GRE, IRE, ITA, ESP) and the group EU-2
(AT, DK, LUX, NLD, POR, SWE, UK).
Table 1: Observations on Unemployment, Hours Worked and Technology Adoption
Unemployment Duration Hours Tech. Adoption
56-07 80-07 ∆ Avg. f≤3 f≥12 H H∗ I90Y
I04
Y
Gap
United States 5.6 6.1 0.5 3.7 70.1 8.9 0.0 0.0 3.1 4.1 0.0
EU-15 6.3 9.2 2.9 10.7 19.8 47.2 12.4 7.9 1.8 2.4 25.3
EU 1 6.6 9.7 3.1 11.0 17.3 49.5 15.5 10.6 1.7 2.1 33.7
EU 2 4.3 5.9 1.6 8.9 28.6 32.5 4.8 1.4 2.2 3.0 6.5
Belgium 7.1 10.3 3.2 12.8 14.5 59.8 24.6 19.4 2.4 1.7 35.4
Finland 5.8 8.5 2.7 7.1 35.2 24.0 1.8 -3.3 2.1 3.7 20.1
France 5.8 8.9 3.1 10.3 20.9 40.6 15.8 11.7 1.2 1.8 30.2
Germany 4.9 7.6 2.7 11.2 18.1 48.0 15.6 11.4 2.1 2.2 23.7
Greece 6.5 8.6 2.1 11.8 14.4 51.1 -4.8 -7.2 0.9 2.2 28.8
Ireland 8.6 10.7 2.1 11.9 17.1 52.0 2.6 -0.6 1.0 1.5 -0.6
Italy 7.5 10.1 2.6 13.1 11.1 61.2 13.1 10.7 1.9 2.4 57.7
Spain 10.1 16.5 6.4 11.3 19.8 49.0 24.1 12.9 1.7 2.1 27.4
Austria 2.9 3.8 0.9 6.9 40.0 25.7 1.9 1.6 1.8 2.3 11.3
Denmark 5.2 7.1 1.9 7.6 33.5 24.9 3.9 -0.9 2.2 3.4 -8.7
Luxembourg 1.6 1.9 0.3 8.8 24.0 30.5 -4.6 -4.6 3.2 2.2 ..
Netherlands 4.6 6.7 2.1 11.0 18.3 44.6 18.7 15.6 1.7 2.7 15.9
Portugal 4.9 6.4 1.5 10.2 21.1 44.9 -2.8 -4.9 2.1 2.1 8.4
Sweden 3.8 5.4 1.6 6.4 46.0 19.9 1.2 -1.1 2.4 3.9 7.6
United Kingdom 5.3 7.8 2.5 8.9 31.4 34.2 3.4 -0.8 1.6 3.1 5.8
Australia 5.2 7.5 2.3 7.4 43.4 26.2 1.2 -3.2 2.2 3.6 3.1
Canada 7.4 8.8 1.4 4.8 59.1 11.6 1.8 -0.5 2.1 3.4 -4.3
Japan 2.5 3.3 0.8 7.2 42.0 22.9 -18.6 -18.8 2.0 3.2 2.1
Norway 2.7 3.8 1.1 4.8 58.9 13.1 7.3 5.9 ... 2.6 ..
Avg.: Average duration of unemployment in months. f≤3 (f≥12): Fraction of unemployed jobless for less than 3 (more
than 12) months. H (H∗): Actual (hypothetical) 1980-2005 average percentage gap in hours worked per person between a
country and the United States. See Section 2 and Appendices D.1 and D.2 for data sources and details. I90/Y (I04/Y ):
Average ICT investment to GDP ratio over the period 1980-90 (1998-2004). The data is taken from the Total Economy
Growth Accounting Database maintained by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the EU KLEMS
Growth and Productivity Accounts. Gap: Technology gap of a country to the United States. See Section 2 and Appendix
D.3 for data sources and details.
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Based on this observation, one may conclude that the use of the average rate of un-
employment to describe the labor market performance in Europe is misleading. The first
three columns of Table 1 reveal that there is, in fact, substantial variation of unemploy-
ment rates across European economies. The first two columns report the average unem-
ployment rates for each country from 1956 to 2007 and from 1980 to 2007, respectively.
The third column reports the percentage points change in 1980-2007 unemployment with
respect to the long-run average. Over the period 1980-07, for instance, seven out of the
16 European labor markets reported in Table 1 produced unemployment rates that were
slightly above or even below the U.S. rate. Thus, when we exclude some of the major
European countries, particularly Germany, France, Italy and Spain, the so-called Euro-
pean unemployment puzzle vanishes6. High unemployment is not a phenomenon that is
specific to Europe, per se, but rather to a certain group of countries.
Figure 2: Unemployment Duration and the post-1970s Change in Unemployment
A distinguishing feature of the U.S. labor market is its fluid nature. The average
duration of an unemployment spell in the U.S. is low relative to many European coun-
tries (see column (4) in Table 1), and the incidence of long-term unemployment is rare.
Columns (5)-(6) in Table 1 show that during 1985-2007, 70.1% of unemployed people in
the U.S. were jobless for less than three month, whereas this rate was less than 25% in
Germany, France, Spain and Italy. In contrast, only 9% of unemployed people in United
States remain jobless for more than one year, whereas the number for Germany, France,
Spain and Italy is between 40-60%. As shown in Figure 2, there is a close relationship
6The ”European Unemployment Puzzle” refers to high and persistent rates of unemployment in Europe
relative to that in the United States.
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between the post-1970 change in the rate of unemployment (depicted on the y-axes) and
the duration of unemployment in the period thereafter (on the x-axes). Countries with
short spells are those that previously experienced a comparatively smaller rise in the rate
of unemployment. This finding suggests that the observed rise in unemployment in the
1980s was mainly driven by a decline in the flow of workers from unemployment back into
employment, as previously observed by Blanchard (2006) and Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2007). Evidently, high unemployment rates in some European countries are the result of
a massive rise in the share of the long-term unemployed population.
Observation 2: Faster Embodied Technical Change
There is evidence, most notably by Cummins and Violante (2002), Greenwood and
Yorukoglu (1997) and Pakko (2002), that the rate of arrival of new technologies has
increased quite substantially since the late 1970s. Table 2 provides an overview of the
existing empirical work. For example, Cummins and Violante (2002) follow the approach
of Gordon (1990) and construct an aggregate index of investment-specific technological
change (ISTC), which is based on a constant-quality price index for investment goods.
They find that average annual growth rates were stable at around 3.6% until the late
1970s and experienced a sharp acceleration in the 1980s, which led to annual growth rates
of more than 5.5% in the subsequent decade. The growth rates of ISTC reported in Table
2 vary due to different data source and time periods considered as well as different types
investments. A closer look at the varieties of investments reveals that ISTC is especially
prominent in computers, communication equipment, and software, whereas durable equip-
ment and structures exhibit lower rates. This finding leads many of the aforementioned
authors to argue that a sizable fraction of the observed acceleration can be attributed to
the intensified adoption and usage of new information and communication technologies
(ICT). The majority of empirical work establishes an economically significant acceleration
of ISTC of 1.5 to 2.5 percentage points per annum.
As argued by Hornstein and Krusell (1996) and Yorukoglu (1998), an increase in the
arrival rate of new technologies has important consequences for the process of technology
adoption. A higher rate of technological change means that new technologies, which have
characteristics that differ substantially from existing ones, are introduced at a faster rate.
This situation raises the issue of compatibility problems between consecutive vintages.
The improved technology embodied in new capital changes technological standards and
decreases compatibility between old and new vintages. Yorukoglu (1998) argues that the
more advanced the new technology is relative to the existing one, the poorer the initial
experience is with the new production technology.
Thus, as the rate of technological change increases, agents are less familiar with the
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new technology, and its adoption is more costly. Therefore, in times of rapid technological
change we should see an increase in the technology gap and a rise in the adoption costs.
Regarding the former, Cummins and Violante (2002) find that the technology gap in
the United States (which they define as the gap between the productivity of the best
technology and the productivity of the average practice in the economy) was 15% in
1975. In 2000, this figure had jumped to 40%, suggesting that firms were not able to keep
up with the accelerated process of technical change. Or in other words, the increased
speed of technological change outpaced firms’ technology updating.
Table 2: The Rise in Investment-Specific Technical Change
source investment type data source growth in ISTC p.a.
period 1 period 2
GY (1997) producers’ durable equipment Gordon, NIPA 1954− 74 : 3.3% 1975− 1990 : 4.0%
KORV (2000) capital equipment Gordon 1963− 79 : 3.6% 1980− 1992 : 6.0%
KORV (2000) capital equipment NIPA 1963− 79 : 0.3% 1980− 1992 : 2.6%
CV (2002) equipment & software CV 1960− 79 : 3.6% 1980− 2000 : 5.5%
Fisher (2006) equipment & software CV 1955− 82 : 3.2% 1983− 2000 : 5.8%
RT (2010) equipment & software CV, RT 1977− 80 : 2.6% 1980− 1990 : 5.5%
Pakko (2002) total private NFI Pakko 1950− 82 : 2.0% 1983− 2000 : 4.0%
JPT (2011) consumer durables & PDI CV 1954− 81 : 1.2% 1982− 2000 : 3.1%
JPT (2011) consumer durables & PDI NIPA 1954− 81 : 0.6% 1982− 2000 : 2.4%
NFI: nonresidential fixed investment, PDI : private domestic investment , GY (1997): Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997),
KORV (2000): Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000), CV (2002): Cummins and Violante (2002), RT (2010):
Rodr´ıguez-Lo´pez and Torres-Chaco´n (2010), JPT (2009): Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011)
Concerning the costs of updating technology, Bessen (2002) provides evidence that
adjustment costs rose sharply during 1974-83 and more than doubled from the early
1960s to the late 1980s. He finds that the costs associated with adopting a new technology
amounted to $0.35 per dollar of investment in 1961-73. In 1974-83, adjustment costs rose
sharply to $0.79 per dollar of investment and peaked at $0.90 in 1984-88. As a result,
adoption costs as a percentage of aggregate output increased from 2.4% in 1973 to 6.5%
in 1983. Bessen (2002) argues that the rise in costs is specifically associated with a change
in firms’ investment towards new technologies.
Observation 3: Technology Gap across Countries
Economic growth in Europe was strong until the 1980s but became weaker in the subse-
quent decades. As a result, a persistent gap in both GDP growth and labor productivity
growth between the United States and most European countries has emerged since the
1980s. By examining data on relative manufacturing output per person, Scarpetta et al.
(2000) show that the productivity level for Germany and other European countries was
converging toward the U.S. level until the 1980s but has since diverged.
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Several Europe economies have lagged behind the United States in terms of the adop-
tion and usage of new technologies. Timmer et al. (2003) report that many European
countries have fallen seriously behind the U.S. in the share of ICT investment in GDP.
Lower investment rates in ICT mean that newer technologies have been adopted less
forcefully. Daveri (2002) and van Ark et al. (2002), among others, find that the diffusion
of new technologies in Europe is following a similar pattern to that observed in the U.S.,
albeit at a considerably slower pace. Moreover, these authors show that ICT investment
intensities increased in all countries over time but (a) most European countries began
investing in ICT with a significant delay, and (b) the gap between the United States and
most European economies has not narrowed significantly.
The lagging technology diffusion is not a feature that applies to Europe in general.
Columns (9)-(10) in Table 1 report the average ICT investment to GDP ratios over the
periods 1980-90 and 1998-2004 (labeled, respectively, by I90
Y
and I04
Y
). It is evident that
there is, in fact, a considerable cross-country heterogeneity with respect to investment in
new technologies. Several European countries - most notably, those that belong to EU-2
- have investment rates that are quite comparable to the U.S. rate. Other countries, such
as Spain, Italy or France, seem to be not only lagging behind but also losing ground over
time. A comparison of the two time periods in columns (9) and (10) reveals that the slack
investment in EU-1 countries is not a temporary phenomenon of the 1980s. Rather, the
investment gap between EU-1 and EU-2 has not narrowed over time but; if anything, it
has been widening over time and remained prevalent in the 1990s. Due to this unequal
investment rates, some countries can be expected to be closer than others to the technol-
ogy frontier or to the United States (as alternative reference point).
To operationalize the concept of the technology gap, I compute, for each country, the
average age of the installed aggregate ICT capital stock and compare it to the U.S. figure.
The reason for focusing on ICT capital instead of aggregate physical capital is that tech-
nological capital, particularly ICT, played a central role in the massive, economy-wide
restructuring process in the 1970s and 1980s. This process led to a higher usage of ICT
capital in production and a steadily rising share of ICT investment in total investment.
Moreover, ICT capital has been identified as the major driver of faster capital-embodied
technical change since the 1970s. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that focusing on the av-
erage age of ICT capital offers the most insight because it best characterizes the process
of technological turnover in the 1970s and 1980s. Column (11) in Table 1 reports the
percentage difference between the average age of ICT capital in a given country to that in
the United States over the period 1980-2007.7. The average age obtained for the United
States is 1.89 years, which is almost identical to the 1.8 years reported in the Bureau of
7A detailed explanation of how the average age of capital is computed can be found in Appendix D.3.
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Economic Analysis’ fixed assets accounts for the average age of computer equipment and
software in 1970-2000. To obtain the value for a specific country, such as Italy, one must
compute (1+57.7/100)*1.89, which yields 3 years. In tranquil times, a gap of one year
may seem negligible, but in times of rapid technical change and annual ISTC growth rates
of more than 5.5%, such a difference implies a substantial productivity gap.
(a) ICT Investment and Productivity Growth (b) Technology Gap and Unemployment Change
Figure 3
It is well known that lower ICT investment rates are key in explaining the poorer
productivity performance of Europe. Panel (a) of Figure 3 illustrates the strong and pos-
itive relation between the level of investment in new technologies and the average annual
labor productivity growth8. Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Jorgensen and Stiroh (2000)
provide evidence that, to a large degree, the U.S.-EU productivity gap can be traced
to the delayed adoption of new technologies in Europe. This finding is confirmed by a
number of studies, including Daveri (2002), Colecchia and Schreyer (2002) and van Ark
et al. (2002). Panel (b) of Figure 3 compares the technology/unemployment performance
across countries. The x-axis represents a country’s technology gap (measured as described
previously), and the y-axis represents the deviation of the country’s unemployment rate
over the period 1980-2007 from its long-run average. Countries with a smaller gap had
a more moderate rise of unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s. Countries belonging to
the EU-2 group exhibit technology adoption behavior similar to the United States, and
the unemployment rates of those economies are comparable to the U.S. rate. Moreover,
unemployment rates increased only slightly in the 1980s. By contrast, economies of the
EU-1 group seem to adopt new technologies at a substantially slower rate while suffering
from persistently high unemployment.
8Panel (a) of Figure 3 reports labor productivity growth that is due to ICT-capital deepening.
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A question that arises in this context is why technology adoption differs so signifi-
cantly across economies. A number of empirical studies, such as McGuckin and van Ark
(2001) and McGuckin et al (2005), argue that structural impediments in product markets
hamper the successful implementation of new technologies across industries in certain Eu-
ropean countries. These barriers appear primarily in the form of burdensome regulations.
Regression estimates by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) suggest that strict product market
regulations that curb competition hinder the adoption and diffusion of new technologies
and thus have a negative effect on productivity. Additional evidence provided by Gust
and Marquez (2002) suggests that countries with more burdensome regulatory environ-
ments tend to adopt new technologies more slowly and have slower productivity growth.
These studies argue that because adoption costs differ across countries, countries with
low adjustment cost adopt new technologies first. Additional evidence in this direction is
provided by Colecchia and Schreyer (2002) and Jerzmanowski (2006).
Unemployment and Hours Worked - A Brief Discourse
A recent strand in the literature has found that total annual hours worked per person in
Europe has gradually deteriorated relative to the United States since the late 1950s. As a
result, European hours worked now fall substantially short of the U.S. figure. Panel (a) of
Figure 4 depicts this evolution9. Column (7) of Table 1 reports the 1980-2005 average per-
centage gap in hours between each country and the United States. Several explanations
have been offered for this phenomenon. Most prominent are those that emphasize the
role of income taxes (Prescott 2004, Ohanian et al. 2008), taxation and home production
(Rogerson 2006, 2008, McDaniel 2011), inequality (Bell and Freeman 2001, Bowles and
Park 2005), preferences (Maoz 2010, Blanchard 2004) and unions (Alesina et al. 2006).
A decline in the total amount of hours worked can potentially result from rising un-
employment. As more people are out of work, all else equal, the total number of hours
worked naturally declines. An important question, therefore, is whether the insights of
the literature on the evolution of the Europe-U.S. gap in hours can shed light on the
observed Europe-U.S. divergence of unemployment rates. Rogerson (2008) argues that
the evolution of the differences in hours worked and differences in unemployment rates
are two distinct phenomena. The key differences concerns the timing: the decline in
European hours worked began in the late 1950s, long before unemployment rates began
to diverge, and continued at a steady pace until the mid-1980s. The major part of the
decline was over when unemployment began to diverge, as illustrated in Figure 1. Thus,
9The total annual hours worked per worker are computed as annual hours worked per worker times
the number of persons employed and the result divided/normalized by the population aged 15-64 years.
This is the standard way in this literature to express total hours worked. A detailed description of how
the data series are constructed together with the data sources can be found in Appendix D.1 .
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even with perfect understanding of the evolution of hours worked, it is not possible to
explain why unemployment rates in the 1980s began to evolve differently across countries.
Consequently, the insights provided by the literature on hours worked offer little guidance
concerning the evolution of unemployment rate differences.
(a) Actual and counterfactual hours (b) Hours gap explained by unemployment
Figure 4
However, the converse does not necessarily apply. Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows that in
the early 1980s, hours worked in Europe and the United States were roughly equal. The
current hours gap originated in the 1980s and was caused by an additional (but short-
lived and moderate) decline in European hours and an increase in U.S. hours of roughly
the same magnitude. The gap emerged at the time when the unemployment rates in
Europe and the United States began to diverge. To assess the impact of the latter on
the evolution of hours, I perform an exercise similar to that in Rogerson (2006). In par-
ticular, I compute the hypothetical hours worked in Europe that would have prevailed
if the unemployment-to-population ratio in Europe had - counterfactually - evolved like
that in the United States. I am, thus, able to quantify the contribution of changes in
the Europe-U.S. unemployment differential to the gap in hours worked10. The result of
this exercise is depicted by the dotted line in Panel (a) of Figure 4, which represents the
hypothetical hours worked in Europe. Prior to the 1980s, the contribution of unemploy-
ment was negligible. This is not surprising because in this period, unemployment rates
in Europe and the United States moved very similarly. During the 1980s, however, the
rise of European unemployment led to a substantial widening of the hours gap. Without
the change in the unemployment differential, European hours would have been higher by
approximately one-third. This can be seen in Panel (b), which reports the percentage
contribution of changes in the unemployment differential to the observed hours gap.
10For a detailed description of the counterfactual experiment see Appendix D.2.
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Column (8) of Table 1 reports the hypothetical hours gap of a country (denoted H∗)
to the United States over the period 1980-2005. It is perhaps most notable that, like
unemployment rates, total hours worked are very different within Europe. EU-2 coun-
tries are very similar to the United States, with a difference in hours that amounts to
approximately 5%. By contrast, EU-1 countries exhibit a gap that is more than 3 times
as large. The divergence of unemployment rates within Europe can help to explain the
divergence of hours worked over time. The coefficient of variation of total hours worked
for the sample of European countries averages 10.2 over the period 1959-1974, and it rises
by more than 20% to 12.5 for the period 1980-2000. If European economies had expe-
rienced the same change in the unemployment-to-population ratio as the United States,
implying no unemployment divergence, the coefficient of variation would remain constant.
Two conclusions follow. First, a non-negligible part of the difference in the observed
hours worked between Europe and the United States can be traced to the different evo-
lution of unemployment rates since the 1980s. Second, to understand the divergence of
hours within Europe, one must understand why unemployment rates evolved so differently
across European economies. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that a good understand-
ing of unemployment performance is important for understanding (at least partly) the
prevailing differences in hours worked across countries.
3 The Model
Vintage Technology and Skills
As an analytical framework, I use a vintage technology model with a frictional labor
market. Time is discrete and denoted by t=0, 1, 2, .... The economy is populated by a
continuum of individuals who can be employed or unemployed. Individuals face a con-
stant probability of death, given by σ. All individuals are risk neutral, and they have
no access to savings technologies. An agent’s objective is to maximize expected wealth,
which is given by the infinite stream of discounted future income.
At each point in time, there exists a range of production technologies denoted by at,τ∈
{at,0, at,1, ..., at,T} that differ with respect to their date of creation. The vintage (or age) of
a certain technology is denoted by τ=0, 1, ..., T . The leading edge technology is given by
at,0 whereas at,T is the oldest that is still in use. T is determined endogenously and can be
interpreted as the critical age at which a technology is scrapped. A new technology arrives
deterministically in each period and grows in productivity at rate g. Hence at+1,0=gat,0,
where at+1,0 and at,0 denote the leading edge in period t+1, and t, respectively. The
productivity of an existing technology remains constant throughout time.
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There is a single homogeneous consumption good in the economy that is produced
by a continuum of firms. Each firm has a single job that is either vacant or filled with
a worker. Firms are heterogeneous with regard to the vintage of the implemented tech-
nology τ . When a new firm is created it installs the most advanced technology that is
available at the given time, that is at,0. An employed worker supplies one unit of labor
inelastically to the firm. Labor is the only input to production. The output of a firm is
a function of the installed technology, and it produces according to yt(τ)=at,τ . In each
period, a firm with a filled job has the choice to keep the currently installed technology,
to upgrade by installing the frontier technology, or to destroy the job. When a firm up-
grades, it incurs a cost χt(τ), which is assumed to depend on the firm’s technology gap -
that is, the distance of the currently installed technology to the leading edge technology.
To operate a technology, a worker is required to possess specific knowledge. This
particular form of human capital will be referred to as production knowledge. It does
not add to worker’s productivity, but is required to operate a certain technology. I follow
Violante (2001) and assume that worker’s production knowledge is characterized by its
limited transferability across vintages. That is, each technology vintage requires specific
knowledge, and the knowledge associated with a given vintage cannot be fully applied
to another technology of a different vintage. Moreover, the transferability decreases with
the distance between two vintages. When a workers is reassigned to a newer technology,
her knowledge must be made compatible with the new procedure. Therefore, χt(τ) is
interpreted as representing the training costs the firm incurs to enable the worker to
operate the new procedure. When ∂χ/∂τ≥0, firms with older technologies pay more to
upgrade because a smaller proportion of the workers’ human capital can be transferred.
The decreasing transferability of skills implies that technical progress leads to human
capital obsolescence. Newer technologies require a different set of skills than existing
ones. With new technologies emerging over time, a worker can utilize only a gradually
declining fraction of her current human capital at the frontier. In the conventional vintage-
technology models of the labor market, such as that in Mortensen and Pissarides (1998),
workers are not constrained by skill requirements when moving across technologies of
different levels of advancement. Individuals in these models can switch to more advanced
technologies without any extra cost. I find this to be an overly stark assumption and
relax it by allowing for a potential dependence of the costs on the worker’s skill gap.
Unemployment and the Labor Market
An existing match can be dissolved for two reasons: exogenous destruction that occurs
with probability 0<ρ<1 or endogenous destruction by firms. A firm destroys a job when
its production technology is too obsolete and updating was not optimal in the past. In-
dividuals are entitled to government-sponsored unemployment insurance, which pays out
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bt>0 in each period of unemployment
11. After a job loss, workers’ production knowledge
remains fully preserved. That is, each unemployed worker continues to possess the knowl-
edge associated with the technology assigned to her prior to displacement. Thus, we can
conveniently use τ to indicate the technology vintage for which an unemployed person
possesses skills. Due to technical progress, the human capital of the unemployed gradu-
ally deteriorates in the same way as the human capital of the employed workers. Hence,
the longer it takes an unemployed person to find a job, the more obsolete her skills will be.
The labor market is frictional. This means that at each point in time, there exists a
certain number of open vacancies, denoted by vt, and a pool of job-searching individuals,
ut. To find a worker, a firm posts a vacancy, which is costly. Let κ>0 be the per-period
cost of keeping the vacancy open. There are no barriers to entry, so any firm that pays
κ can enter the labor market and create a job opening. The total number of unemployed
workers is given by ut=
∑
τ ut(τ), where ut(τ) is the mass of unemployed workers with
knowledge of vintage τ . New job matches are denoted by mt and are determined by a
matching function that is homogeneous of degree one, bounded above by min{vt, ut} and
increasing in both arguments. The matching function that is adopted here has become
the standard choice in the search and matching literature:
mt = m (vt, ut) = min
{
m¯vdt u
1−d
t , vt, ut
}
, (1)
where m¯>0 is a shift factor and 0<d<1 is the elasticity of matches with respect to va-
cancies. The probability of a firm meeting an individual with skills for vintage τ is:
qt(τ) =
m(vt, ut)
vt
ut(τ)
ut
= m (θt) θ
−1
t φt(τ), (2)
where θt=vt/ut is a measure of labor market tightness, and φt(τ)=ut(τ)/ut is the mass of
unemployed individuals with human capital τ . Similarly, let pt denote the probability of
an unemployed worker encountering a firm with an open vacancy:
pt = m (vt, ut) /ut = m (θt) . (3)
Vacancies are all identical; hence, p is the same for all individuals. The existence of a
matching frictions in the labor market implies workers looking for a job trigger a congestion
effect. The greater the number of individuals looking for a job, the lower the probability
of encountering a vacancy. The same holds for firms with open vacancies. Therefore,
firms’ incentive to post vacancies is governed by the tightness of the market.
11The government in this economy levies a lump-sum tax on employed individuals to finance the
insurance system, and it is assumed to run a balanced budget every period.
17
The Value Functions
The constant growth in the technology frontier induces a natural trend in several of the
model’s endogenous variables. To render the model stationary, all growing variables are
divided by the common growth factor given by the productivity at the frontier at,0.
All decisions within a match, including matching, wages and technology upgrading,
are made jointly by the firm and the worker. The timing of decisions is such that a firm
and a worker first decide on the technology upgrade and, conditional on the outcome,
they then bargain over wages. The value functions for an employed worker and a firm
are, respectively, E¯ and J¯ after the upgrading decision, whereas before the upgrading
decision, they are given as E and J . The state of a match is described by the vintage of
the installed technology, τ . Hence, for a given wage rate ω (τ) we can write J¯ as follows:
J¯(τ) = y (τ)− ω (τ) + βg (1− σ) (1− ρ) J (τ + 1) . (4)
ρ is the rate of exogenous job destruction, with probability σ the worker dies between
two consecutive periods and β is the discount factor. The instantaneous return for a firm
is given by the output net of wage payments, y (τ)-ω (τ). If the match survives to the
next period, the age of the installed technology becomes τ+1. The value of a job for an
employed worker after the upgrading decision is:
E¯ (τ) = ω(τ) + βg(1− σ) [(1− ρ)E(τ + 1) + ρU(τ + 1)] . (5)
The total value consists of the current period’s wage income ω(τ) and the discounted
future surplus. The latter term takes into account that the job might be hit by an
exogenous destruction shock, in which case the worker becomes unemployed. The value
of unemployment is given by U(τ). The joint surplus of a job is defined as the sum of the
job values for the firm and the worker, net of the respective outside options. The outside
option for a worker is the value of unemployment U , and for a firm is it the value of an
unfilled vacancy, which in equilibrium, is equal to zero. For a job with vintage τ<T , the
joint surplus is defined as S¯(τ)=J¯(τ)+E¯(τ)-U(τ). A match is dissolved when the joint
surplus of remaining in the match falls below zero. Using the firm’s and the worker’s
value functions, as stated in (4) and (5), we can rewrite S¯ as follows:
S¯(τ) = max
T∈N0
{
T−1∑
t=τ
β˜t−τy(t)−
T−1∑
t=τ
β˜t−τ [U(t)− βg(1− σ)U(t+ 1)] + β˜T S¯(T )
}
, (6)
where β˜=βg(1-σ)(1-ρ) is the effective discount factor, and T is the age of the technol-
ogy at which it is scrapped. The joint surplus consists of three parts. The first term repre-
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sents the discounted stream of output that the technology produces over its lifetime. From
that term is deducted the present discounted value of what the worker can get elsewhere.
This term (in square brackets) is equal to b+βg(1−σ) [E¯(0)− IE(t+ 1)− U(t+ 1)], and
it is the sum of the value the worker can get in unemployment b and the expected dis-
counted value of a new job net of training cost IE. The third term in Equation (6) is the
value of the match at the time when the current technology is scrapped. At T , the firm
can upgrade to the frontier, in which case it must pay χ(T ), or it can destroy the job.
Therefore, we can write S(T )=max{S¯(0)-χ(T ), 0}. The key decision of a firm amounts
to finding the optimal scrapping age T . Notice that T is the same for all firms and is
constant over time. The former is true because there is no match heterogeneity other
than the vintage heterogeneity. The latter holds because the frontier grows at a constant
rate. In the following section, the scrapping decision is examined in more detail.
The Updating Problem and Wage Setting
The decision-making process is sequential. Before the firm and the worker bargain over
the wage, they decide whether to upgrade the production technology. At each point in
time, a firm/worker pair seeks to maximize the joint surplus of the match. This rule also
applies to identifying the optimal time to scrap the existing production technology and
adopt a new technology. In this set-up, upgrading means that a firm jumps to the frontier
and adopts the current leading-edege technology. Here, updating to the frontier comes by
assumption. This assumption is essentially irrelevant because the same result is obtained
if firms can choose the vintage12. Retooling is costly, and a firm that upgrades must invest
in its worker’s human capital to make it compatible with the new technology. Upgrading
occurs when the joint value net of costs is positive:
J¯ (0) + E¯ (0)− χ(τ) > J¯ (τ) + E¯ (τ) . (7)
The scrapping value of an old technology is zero because no secondary markets exist
in this economy. The upgrading costs are shared between the firm and the worker. More
precisely, the total costs, χ(τ), are allocated to maximize the surplus:
max
IE ,IJ
[J¯(0)− IJ − J¯(τ)]η[E¯(0)− IE − E¯(τ)]1−η (8)
s.t. IJ + IE = χ(τ).
12 The reason for that is the following: The cost of updating from vintage τ to τ ′ < τ depends only the
distance between τ and τ ′. After t periods the vintages will be equal to τ + t and τ ′ + t but the cost is
still the same as the distance obviously has not changed. At the same time, the relative productivity gain
of retooling is given by g−τ
′
/g−τ = gτ−τ
′
, which is also a function of the distance τ − τ ′ only. Therefore,
the net surplus (productivity gain minus cost) of updating from τ to τ ′ is the same as that of moving
from τ − τ ′ to 0. It does not pay off for firms to wait for a technology to fall behind the frontier and then
to adopt it. The payoffs of adopting a technology right away and adopting it later are the same.
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IJ and IE are the costs borne by the firm and the worker, and the parameter η ∈ [0, 1]
indicates the firm’s weight in the bargain. The solution to the problem in (8) is a sharing
rule that satisfies the first-order condition (1−η)[J¯(0)−IJ− J¯(τ)] = η[E¯(0)−IE− E¯(τ)].
The second step in the decision making sequence concerns the wage bargain. The firm
and the worker engage in a bilateral bargaining process in which they choose a wage rate
to maximize the joint surplus of the match. This optimization problem reads as follows:
max
ω
J¯(τ)η
[
E¯(τ)− U (τ)]1−η . (9)
Optimality implies (1-η)J¯(τ)=η[E¯(τ)-U (τ)], which holds for all τ<T . The wage ω can
be expressed by combining the first-order condition with the value functions in (4)-(5):
ω(τ) = (1− η)y(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
worker’s share in current suplus
+η
U(τ)− βg(1− σ)U(τ + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
worker’s outside option
 . (10)
Match Formation
All newly created jobs are assumed to embody the leading-edge technology. That is, after
matching with a worker, a firm installs the technology a0. This assumption will be relaxed
later on. A newly created firm incurs re-training costs χ(τ) to make the skills of the new
worker compatible with the installed technology. The principle of cost sharing applies not
only to ongoing matches that update but also to newly formed matches. Similar to the
problem above, the total re-training costs for a new match are allocated according to:
max
IE ,IJ
[J¯(0)− IJ ]η[E¯(0)− IE − U(τ)]1−η (11)
s.t. IJ + IE = χ(τ).
The value of the worker’s outside option affects how the training costs are shared. For
instance, a worker who receives generous unemployment benefits has a valuable outside
option and thus a high opportunity cost of working. For such a worker to agree to form the
match and leave unemployment, the firm must offer a greater share of the total surplus
by allowing the worker to pay a smaller fraction of the total costs. In contrast, U(τ)
is decreasing in τ . A worker with more obsolete skills has a lower outside option and,
therefore, pays a larger fraction of the total costs. The value function of an unemployed
worker with the skills for vintage τ is given by:
U(τ) = b+ βg(1− σ){p(θ) [E¯(0)− IE(τ)]+ (1− p(θ))U(τ + 1)} , (12)
with probability p(θ) that an unemployed worker encounters a vacancy and becomes
employed. The value of the match, net of training costs, is E¯(0)− IE(τ). If no matching
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takes place in the current period, the worker remains unemployed in the next period. In
this case, the obsolescence of her production knowledge increases to τ+1.
With free entry into the labor market, all gains from posting vacancies must be ex-
hausted in equilibrium. In other words, the cost of opening a vacancy must equal the
expected return. The implied zero-profit condition of the firm is:
κ = βg(1− σ)
∑
τ
q(τ)
[
J¯(0)− IJ(τ)] , (13)
with probability q(τ) the firm encounters a worker with the human capital for vintage
τ , in which case the net surplus of a match is J¯(0)− IJ(τ). All new jobs yield the same
value, J¯(0), but the training cost depends on which worker the firm meets. There is no
directed search in the model, so the firm can expect to be matched with any worker. This
is taken into account by summing over all possible skill states τ . With the definition of
q(τ), as stated in Equation (2), the zero-profit condition writes:
κ = βg(1− σ)m(θ)θ−1
[
J¯(0)−
∑
τ
φ(τ)IJ(τ)
]
. (14)
The term in square brackets is the expected surplus for a firm conditional on matching,
and
∑
τ φ(τ)I
J(τ) is the expected training cost. Condition (14) pins down the equilib-
rium market tightness, θ, and thereby determines other endogenous variables such as the
unemployment rate. The average obsolescence of workers’ skills plays an important role
in shaping aggregate labor market outcomes. The incentives for a firm to create a new
job depend on the surplus it can expect, which is a function of the quality of human cap-
ital among the unemployed. The dependence of aggregate job creation on average skill
obsolescence gives rise to an externality: when firms optimally set T they do not take into
consideration the effect of their decision on the average human capital obsolescence of un-
employed individuals. The higher T is, the longer technologies are kept in operation and
the older, on average, the vintages from which workers eventually separate. Therefore,
the average human capital obsolescence among the unemployed is higher. This affects the
expected hiring costs of all unmatched firms and their incentive to create new jobs.
We can now state the definition of a stationary equilibrium in this model
Definition. A stationary equilibrium in this economy consists of a set of value functions
S¯ and U together with a maximum age T that solve the updating problem stated in (6), a
set of sharing rules IJ , IE that solve the cost sharing problem in (8) for existing, and in
(11) for new matches, a value of market tightness θ that satisfies the zero-profit condition
in (14), and a distribution of unemployed workers φ that is time-invariant.
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A Different Representation of the Firm’s State
Let z denote a firm’s relative productivity with respect to the technology frontier, and
define it as z = g−τ=aτ/a0, with z ∈ {z¯, ..., g−1, 1}. Then, 1-z represents the percentage
difference of a firm’s current productivity to the frontier, which is referred to as a firm’s
technology gap. The size of the gap is a function of a firm’s vintage τ and the growth rate
of the technology frontier. Until now, a firm’s state has been described by the vintage
of it’s technology, τ . From this point, I use a firm’s relative productivity z. This has
several advantages. τ was chosen mainly for illustrative purposes. Each vintage is closely
liked to the time dimension; therefore, τ allows for an intuitive depiction of the vintage
structure that prevails in the economy. However, from a technical point of view, it is more
convenient to work with z because it is better suited to evaluate the obsolescence of a
given technology. The vintage τ says how ”old” a technology is but not how it compares
to the frontier in terms of productivity. Metaphorically speaking, when the frontier does
not move at all (that is, when g=1), then any two different technologies (for example,
of vintage τ=5 and τ=100) are equally productive. In both cases, z=1. Therefore, in
any experiment that involves changes in g, such as the one implemented here, z is the
preferred choice over τ to describe the state of a firm. When the state is z, the decision
of the firm is to choose the cutoff productivity for its technology, that is z¯=g−T .
4 The Analytical Part - Gaining Intuition
The model at hand is too complex to allow for closed-form results and to analytically
examine the channels between technology updating and labor market outcomes. However,
a good understanding of these channels is fundamental for interpreting the results of
the quantitative section. To foster the understanding of the model, a stripped-down,
continuous-time analog is studied very briefly in the next section. More precisely, the full
model of the previous section is simplified as follows: (a) the firm’s bargaining power η
is set to unity, implying that the entire surplus of the match accrues to the firm (that is
J¯(z)=S¯(z)) and that the worker is payed her reservation wage ω(z)=ω=b; (b) the firm
incurs all the costs from technology updating and worker training (i.e. IJ(z)=χ(z) and
IE(z)=0). An immediate implication is that the value of unemployment is constant and
independent of the worker’s skill level: U(z)=U ; (c) the per-period probability of dying
σ is set equal to zero to reduce notational clutter. These simplifications remove only as
many parts as necessary to make the model analytically tractable. The main tradeoff
and channels underlying the full model are preserved13. The switch to continuous time is
made because the discreteness of the updating choice prevented closed-form calculations.
Instead, with continuous time, the choice is a continuous variable.
13Appendix A deals with the complete description of the model’s elements, the derivation of the equi-
librium, and questions concerning the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
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The first key equation describes the problem of the firm. Equation (15) states that
the firm optimally chooses the cutoff productivity z¯ to maximize the job surplus:
S(1) = S = max
z¯∈[0,1]
{
1
g
∫ 1
z¯
z
r+ρ−g
g
−1 [z − b] dz + z¯ r+ρ−gg S(z¯)
}
. (15)
The total surplus consists of (a) the discounted stream of output y net of the worker’s
outside value b, and (b) the present value of the match that has reached the cutoff pro-
ductivity. At z¯, the choice of the firm is to decide whether to retool or to destroy the
job; hence, S(z¯)=max {S − χ(z¯), 0}. In the following section, I focus on the case in which
updating is the optimal choice14. The worker’s outside value comprises only the flow
value of unemployment b because, for η=1, the surplus that the worker can receive in any
other job is equal to zero. If updating is optimal (that is, when S>χ(z¯)), the first-order
condition for the problem is obtained by setting ∂S/∂z¯ = 0 which yields the following:
z¯ − b︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of keeping current technology
= (r + ρ− g) [S − χ(z¯)]− z¯gχ′(z¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounted value of updating
). (16)
A firm that decides when to upgrade trades off the following considerations. On the
one hand, by scrapping the technology now, the firm foregoes the future (net) output
the current technology can produce. On the other hand, by delaying the updating of
the technology, the firm foregoes the productivity gains of a newer technology and faces
higher costs of retooling in future. The latter is a consequence of updating costs χ being
a function of the firm’s technology gap, which is gradually widening with time. Condition
(16) states that at the optimum, the net output of the match with the old technology
z¯ − b must be equal to the net flow value of the match with the frontier technology
(r + ρ− g)[S¯ − χ(z¯)] plus the marginal costs of waiting −z¯gχ′(z¯) = ∂χ
∂z
∂z
∂τ
|z=z¯. The first-
order condition can be combined with condition (15) to obtain the following expression,
which implicitly determines the optimal cutoff productivity z¯:
1
g
∫ 1
z¯
z
r+ρ−g
g
−1 [z − z¯] dz = χ(z¯)
[
1 + χ,z
(
1− z¯ r+ρ−gg
) g
r + ρ− g
]
, (17)
where χ,z = χ
′z¯/χ. Appendix A establishes conditions for which z¯ ∈ (0, 1) exists and
is unique. It can be shown that z¯ is negatively related to the updating costs χ. When
it is more costly to retool, the optimal cutoff productivity is lower, and firms wait longer
before scrapping the technology. From (17), it emerges that the cutoff productivity z¯ is
only a function of the model’s deep parameters and is independent of any endogenous
variable or of the value of unemployment benefits b. The first-order condition (16) can be
rewritten to express the value of a new job as S¯, which can then be combined with the
zero-profit condition κ = p(θ)θ−1 [S − E(χ)] to obtain:
14The case of job destruction being the optimal choice is studied in Appendix A.
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κ = p(θ)θ−1
[
z¯ − b+ z¯gχ′(z¯)
r + ρ− g + E [χ(z¯)− χ]
]
. (18)
E(χ) =
∫ 1
0
χ(z)dΦz is the expected value of re-training costs, and Φz is the cumu-
lative distribution of unemployed individuals over skill states z. Φz can be expressed in
closed-form, as shown in Appendix A. The term inside the square brackets is the expected
surplus of a job for a firm, conditional on meeting a worker. The first term, z¯−b+z¯gχ
′(z¯)
r+ρ−g ,
is equal to S − χ(z¯), and it represents the value of a match with a new technology net of
upgrading costs. With z¯ determined by (17), Condition (18) pins down the equilibrium
labor market tightness θ and thus the equilibrium unemployment rate u = ρ
ρ+p(θ)
.
A firm with a filled job can install a new technology in two ways: it can upgrade the
technology within the existing job, or it can destroy the job (which involves firing the
currently employed worker), create a new one and find a new employee. In the first case,
the incurred costs are χ(z¯), whereas in the second case, the costs depend on the skill level
of new worker. The second term in (18), given by E [χ(z¯)− χ], measures the expected
difference in costs between retooling on the job and upgrading through the destruction
of the job. This difference can be positive or negative, depending on the average human
capital obsolescence among the unemployed.
Condition (18) describes a negative relationship between the expected surplus of a job
for a firm S-E(χ) and the equilibrium unemployment rate u. The intuition behind this
relation is straightforward and common to a large class of labor market matching models.
The zero-profit condition implies that any change in the expected surplus is accompanied
by an adjustment in the labor market tightness θ. Firms that face a lower return on
creating a job require compensation so that they are able to recoup the vacancy costs
κ. The compensation comes in the form of a lower market tightness θ, which raised the
contact rate for the firm p(θ)θ−1 and reduces the time until the job is filled. At the same
time, a lower θ implies a decreased probability for an unemployed worker to find an open
position. This, in turn, depresses the flow of unemployed workers back into employment
and causes the duration and the level of unemployment to rise.
In what follows, the analytical model is used to study (a) the effects of technical
change on unemployment and (b) the role firms’ technology choice plays in how faster
technical change affects labor market outcomes. The experiment that is considered is a
permanent rise in g, which is meant to simulate the observed 1970s acceleration in the
rate of embodied technical change. Two equations are central in the analysis: Equation
(17), which determines firms’ optimal cutoff z¯, and Equation (18), which pins down the
equilibrium labor market tightness θ. The first step determines how firms respond to faster
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technical change. From condition (17), it is clear that the updating decision is independent
of any endogenous variable, which greatly facilitates the analysis of the optimal cutoff z¯.
Proposition 1. A firm’s optimal cutoff level for productivity z¯ is weakly decreasing in
the growth rate of the technology frontier g. (Proof is in Appendix C)
The proposition establishes that in times of faster technical change, firms tolerate a
larger critical productivity gap to the frontier 1 − z¯. This is an interesting finding. It
implies that firms do not entirely keep up with the pace of innovation, but rather allow
the marginal technology z¯ to fall behind the technological frontier. As an immediate
implication, the productivity range in the economy {z¯, ..., 1} expands, which causes the
average practice in the economy to deteriorate.
The next step explores the effects of a higher g, together with the implied drop in
z¯, on labor market variables. To this end, we focus our attention on Equation (18). To
isolate the different effects individually, we first analyze the (partial equilibrium) effects
on the net value of a job z¯−b+z¯gχ
′(z¯)
r+ρ−g , and then focus on the term E[χ(z¯)-χ]. Two opposing
effects are at work: first, a rise in the growth rate g lowers the firm’s net discount rate,
given by r+ρ-g. This is the rate at which a firm capitalizes future income emerging from
the current technology and any future upgrading. A higher g means that future profits
are discounted at a lower rate. This leads to a rise in the discounted stream of profits and
therefore to a rise in the value of the job. Second, as illustrated above, a larger g lowers
the cutoff productivity z¯. Allowing for higher technological obsolescence of the job lowers
the value of the job15. These two effects are respectively referred to as the capitalization
effect and the obsolescence effect. Which of these two effects dominates is crucial for the
effect of faster technical change on the total surplus and, ultimately unemployment.
Proposition 2. An increase in the rate of embodied technical change g leads to a rise
(fall) in the net value of a job z¯−b+z¯gχ
′(z¯)
r+ρ−g if the updating cost χ are sufficiently low (high).
There is a unique value of χ for which the net value of a job remains unchanged. (Proof
is in Appendix C)
The proposition says that the net effect of g on the value of a job depends on how
frequently firms retool their technologies (which is itself govern by the underlying updating
costs χ). The capitalization effect dominates when updating is cheap. The underlying
logic is as follows: when costs are low, firms retool frequently and stay close to the
frontier. In this way, they can directly participate in the higher productivity growth
at the frontier. In contrast, when updating costs are high and retooling occurs only
sluggishly, then the obsolescence effect dominates and leads to a decline in match surplus.
15The first term in the numerator unambiguously declines with g. The second term is irrelevant if costs
are constant χ′=0, and if χ′(z)>0, a sufficient condition for the numerator to decline is |∂z¯∂g gz¯ |<1.
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The implications for unemployment follow straightforwardly from Equation (18) and are
depicted in Figure 5. There, the lower solid line represents equilibrium unemployment
(y-axis) in the benchmark economy, where costs are given by χ (x-axis). When g rises,
we observe a drop in unemployment in those economies that face low costs and, therefore,
update frequently. In that case, the capitalization effect dominates, which leads to a rise
in the job surplus and a drop in unemployment. By contrast, for economies to the right
of the pivotal point, the obsolescence effect dominates, which causes unemployment to
rise. The more sluggish the updating is, the stronger the obsolescence effect and the more
pronounced the rise in unemployment16.
Figure 5: Decomposing the Total Unemployment Change
After considering the value of a job, the final step explores how the second term in
Equation (18) E[χ(z¯)-χ], changes when growth accelerates. This expression measures
how much a firm expects to additionally pay for installing a new technology on the job
instead of hiring and training a new worker for a newly created job. It is impossible to
formally establish how E[χ(z¯)-χ] behaves when g changes. Therefore, in what follows,
the focus is on the change in expected costs E(χ), which can be expressed in closed-
form (see Appendix A)17. When g rises, E(χ) changes for the following reasons: (a)
a higher g implies that the human capital of the unemployed becomes obsolete at a
faster rate; (b) the drop in the cutoff z¯ (see above) implies that workers are matched,
on average, with more outdated technologies. Hence, when workers eventually separate
from the job and enter unemployment, their skills are, on average, more obsolete; (c) a
decreased θ (see above) means that unemployed workers find new jobs at a lower rate.
16The parameter values underlying Figure 5 are as follows: ρ = 0.1, r = 0.05, b = 0.25, m¯ = 1, κ = 1,
d = 0.5, g = 0.01, g′ = 0.04, and the functional form for χ is χ(z) = a− z, with a ∈ [1, 4.5].
17Evidently, by disregarding the change in χ(z¯) we miss an important aspect, but, nevertheless, the
analysis of E(χ) in itself allows for important insights.
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They remain in unemployment for a longer time and have longer exposure to the process
of skill depreciation. All three factors lead to a deterioration of the average skills of the
unemployed, implying that in times of faster technical change, it becomes more costly to
hire and train a new employee. The increase in costs worsens the incentives to create new
jobs and tends to raise unemployment. This third effect is referred to as the cost effect,
which occurs in addition to the capitalization effect and the obsolescence effect. In Figure
5, the cost effect is illustrated by the shift from the dashed line to the upper solid line.
5 The Quantitative Analysis
This section uses the quantitative model to explore the effects of faster embodied technical
change on labor market variables and other macroeconomic outcomes. The analysis is
divided into two parts. After calibrating the model, I first examine the effects in the
benchmark economy, that is, the calibrated U.S. economy, and in two stylized versions of
European-type welfare state economies. This first part is intended to illustrate the main
channels at work and their quantitative importance. The second part performs a cross-
country analysis, in which I match the observed technology gap for each country relative
to the United States and then simulate the increase in technical change and observe the
extent to which the model fits the country’s observed path of unemployment.
Calibration and Parameterization
The quantitative model is calibrated to a selected set of U.S. micro- and macro-observations.
The model period is one month. The personal discount factor β=0.99633 is chosen so that
the implied annualized interest rate equals 4.5%. Individuals face a per-period probability
of dying σ=0.00185; thus, on average, they spend 45 years in the labor force18. I follow
the standard practice in the search-matching literature and set both the firm’s bargaining
weight η and the elasticity of matches with respect to vacancies d equal to 0.5. The value
of unemployment benefits b is taken from the Labour Market Institutions Database as-
sembled by Nickell and Nunziata (2001). b is set equal to 0.26, which corresponds to the
1960-1995 average of U.S. first-year unemployment benefits (averaged over family types
of recipients), measured in terms of the percentage of average pre-tax earnings.
The rate of growth of the frontier technology g is calibrated as in Parente (2000)
and set so that the annualized rate of embodied technical change is equal to 2%. The
choice of the functional form and the parameters of the updating cost function χ(z) is
not an easy task, and the empirical literature does not provide guidance on this matter.
Therefore, I choose to be cautious and proceed by adopting a specific functional form,
18σ>0 is needed for computational reasons as it ensures the existence of finite support for the distri-
bution of unemployed workers.
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and later, in Section 6, I check the robustness of the results to alternative choices of χ.
Here, the cost function is chosen as χ(z)=(1 + pi) z−µ, where pi≥0 and µ>0 are param-
eters. I follow Parente and Prescott (1994) and interpret pi as a distortion parameter,
which is country-specific and measures the size of the barriers to technology adoption for
firms in a given country. In the baseline calibration, which refers to the United States,
pi=0. This normalization is unimportant because, in the analysis that follows, we are
interested in a country’s technology gap relative to that in the United States. pi will be
calibrated subsequently and separately for each country to fit the observed technology gap.
Four parameters remain for which values must be assigned. The values of κ, ρ, m¯ and
µ are tied down by the following four U.S. observations: (i) an average unemployment
rate for 1948-2007 of 5.5926%, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); (ii)
an average monthly unemployment-to-employment transition probability for 1967-2007
of 32.11%, taken from Shimer (2005); (iii) a monthly job filling rate of 71%, taken from
denHaan et al. (2000) and Hagedorn and Manovsky (2008); and (iv) the ratio of equip-
ment investment to real output for 1948-2007 of 4.9804%, as reported by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA)19. The resulting values of the parameters are reported in Table
3, and Table 4 describes the performance of the model in matching the targets. The
monthly cost of an open vacancy κ is 0.40252. Given an equilibrium (average) wage equal
to 0.9192, this value yields an average recruitment cost (computed as κθ/p(θ)) of 2.7 weeks
of workers’ earnings. This is only slightly lower than Hamermesh’s (1993) estimate, who
estimates average hiring costs per worker, on average, to be one month’s wages. At the
same time, the implied total recruiting costs as a fraction of aggregate output is 0.0156,
which is close to Andolfatto’s (1996) estimate of 0.01. The scale parameter of the match-
ing function m¯ = 0.4775 and the monthly probability of exogenous job destruction ρ is
found to be 0.017169. This value implies that a worker is laid off due to exogenous rea-
sons, on average, after 4.8 years. In the benchmark calibration, exogenous job destruction
is the only source of match separation. Endogenous job separation is not performed in
equilibrium. For the calibrated value of ρ, the model generates a median job tenure of 3.3
years. This compares well to Hall’s (1982) estimate and to more recent figures provided
by the BLS. Hall (1982) finds median tenure in the United States to be 3.6 years in 1978,
and the BLS reports a median tenure of workers for 1996-2009 in the range of 3.5-4.1 years.
The curvature parameter of the cost function µ is found to be 7.6323, which is also
equal to the elasticity of adoption costs with respect to firm’s technology gap 1-z. This
value implies that adoption costs are increasing and mildly convex in the technology gap.
Two years after the last update, a firm incurs costs equal to 1.4 months of output when
19The investment data is taken from BEA’s fixed assets accounts, and the ratio is computed as gross
private domestic investment in equipment and software (without transportation) divided by real GDP.
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updating to the frontier. After 5 years and 10 years, the adoption costs amount to 2.1 and
4.5 months of match output, respectively. The empirical literature lacks direct, firm-level
estimates to which these numbers could be compared. Thus, we rely on information about
the aggregate adoption costs to evaluate the model’s fit. Bessen finds adoption costs in
the U.S. manufacturing sector, as a percentage of (manufacturing) output, of 2.4% in
1973. This is very close to the model’s outcome of 2.7%.
Table 3: Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Definition Value
β Discount rate 0.99633
η Firms’ bargaining power 0.5
b Unemployment income 0.26
d Elasticity of matches w.r.t unemployment 0.5
σ Probability of dying 0.001852
g Growth rate of technology frontier 1.0017
pi Cost shift parameter 0
κ Per-period cost of a vacancy 0.40252
m¯ Matching function: Scale parameter 0.4775
µ Curvature parameter of the cost function 7.6323
ρ Probability of exogenous job destruction 0.017169
The equilibrium labor market tightness θ is obtained directly from Equations (2) and
(3), which imply that θ = p/q. Both, p and q served as targets in the calibration, so
we can derive θ straightforwardly from θ = 0.32114/0.71 = 0.4523. This value accords
well with the number 0.539 obtained by Hall (2005) from the Job Openings and Labor
Turnover Survey (JOLTS). After a job loss, the model predicts that an individual will
remain unemployed, on average, for 3.1 months before finding a new job. This is only
slightly lower than the 3.4 months the OECD reports for the average U.S. unemployment
spell over the period 1968-2005. Admittedly, the good fit of the model with regard to
the unemployment duration comes naturally because the empirical unemployment-to-
employment transition probability served as a target in the calibration of the model.
Table 4: Matching the Calibration Targets
Value
Target Data Model
Unemployment rate, u 0.05592 0.05593
Unemployment-employment transition probability, p 0.32114 0.32114
Job filling rate, q 0.71 0.71
Investment to output ratio 0.04981 0.04980
In the baseline scenario, the optimal scrapping age of a technology is 3.7 years. With
2% annual growth, this implies a critical value for a firm’s productivity gap of 1-z¯=1-
g−T=7%. T indicates the age of the oldest technology in the economy and thus marks
the cutoff point for the range of vintages that are installed. T can be combined with
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the stationary distribution of firms φf (τ) to compute the average age of the technologies
installed20. The average age is found to be 1.6 years which is in line with the 1.8 years
reported by the BEA for the average age of computer equipment and software over the
period 1970-2000. Overall, the calibrated model produces a good fit of all targeted mo-
ments and of a number of non-targeted empirical observations on labor market outcomes
and technological variables. I consider this as a first success of the quantitative model.
Laissez-Faire vs. Welfare-State Economies
In this section, I examine the effects of rapid embodied technical change in the bench-
mark case and in two stylized versions of European-type welfare state economies. Section
4 above isolated the main transmission channels analytically. Now these channels are
studied quantitatively. To that end, an experiment is performed that simulates a one-
time, permanent increase of 2 percentage points per annum in the rate of technical change
g. This value marks the mid-point of the 1.5-2.5% range determined by the empirical lit-
erature for the 1970-rise in embodied technical change (see Section 2).
In addition to the calibrated U.S. benchmark economy, the experiment considers two
different versions of stylized European welfare state economies. For convenience, the for-
mer is referred to as LF economy (short for ”Laissez-Faire”), and to the two latter are
referred to as WS-1 and WS-2 economies. The common characteristic of the welfare state
economies is that jobless workers receive more generous unemployment benefits (than in
the LF economy). In both, the WS-1 and the WS-2, b=0.38 which is the 1960-1995 aver-
age of benefits (as a percentage of pre-tax earnings) received by unemployed individuals
in the EU-15. This value is obtained from the aforementioned Labour Market Institu-
tions Database21. What distinguishes WS-1 from WS-2 economies is the cost firms incur
when adopting a new technology. The evidence presented in Section 2 argued that certain
European economies have lagged behind the rest of Europe and the United States in the
implementation and usage of new technologies. Moreover, this pattern has been found
to be caused by differences in the strictness of regulatory environments across countries,
which translates into differences in the underlying adoption-cost structure.
Two cost scenarios are considered to account for these differences. In WS-1, the policy
distortion parameter pi=0, so firms in this economy face the same conditions as the firms
in the LF economy. In WS-2, pi = 0.4 so the implied technology gap (to the LF economy)
matches the observed 25% technology gap of the EU-15 to the United States (see Table
1). The quantitative results for the different regimes are reported in the three panels of
20The distribution of firms over vintages, φf (τ), is straightforward to compute and it can be expressed
as φf (τ) = [(1−ρ)(1−σ)]
τPT−1
t=0 [(1−ρ)(1−σ)]t
for 0 ≤ τ < T , and φf (τ) = 0 for τ ≥ T .
21The EU-15 value of b is obtained by averaging the b’s of all countries and using population as weights.
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Table 5. Notice that all other parameters, except for b and pi, are the same across the cases.
The first row in each panel depicts the model’s results for the initial steady-state, in
which g = 2%, whereas the second row is for g = 4%. The cutoff productivity 1− z¯ is the
same in LF and WS-1 but is larger in WS-2. Higher costs curb firms’ incentives to scrap
old technology, so we observe firms in WS-2 updating relatively less frequently. In all the
three cases, we observe the technology gap 1− z¯ widening as g increases. This is in line
with the analytical result from Section 4: firms extend the run-time of their technologies
and allow for a higher critical gap when technical change accelerates. A lower cutoff pro-
ductivity implies a higher average obsolescence of the installed vintages and of workers’
production knowledge associated with these vintages. Eventually, workers separate from
their jobs, due to job destruction and move into unemployment. As a result, the average
human capital of unemployed individuals z¯u deteriorates, as illustrated in the second col-
umn of Table 5. The skill obsolescence of an unemployed worker determines the amount
of training that is necessary in the event of a match. As average skills are more outdated,
firms expect larger training expenses E(IJ) when hiring a worker (third column). Higher
costs of job creation reduce firms’ incentives to post vacancies v (fourth column). In turn,
this leads to a decline in job creation, which makes it more difficult for unemployed work-
ers to find new jobs. Consequently, the number of people who flow back into employment
declines, causing both the average duration du and the rate of unemployment u to rise.
The labor markets in the LF and the WS-1 economies evolve, in general, very simi-
larly. Unemployment rises in the laissez-faire economy by about 0.7 percentage points (or
12.5%) and by only slightly more in the first welfare-state economy. The more generous
unemployment insurance induces a higher initial rate of unemployment, but, apart from
this level effect, it does not seem to have a dynamic effect on how unemployment responds
to faster technical change22.
In the second welfare state economy, the picture is very different because the rise in un-
employment is much more pronounced. The explanation for this pattern proceeds along
the same lines identified within the analytical model of Section 4. The total increase in
unemployment can be decomposed into three factors: the obsolescence, the capitalization
and the cost effect. The contribution of each of these to explaining the total effect is
reported in columns (6)-(8) of Table 5 and labeled as ∆obs., ∆cap. and ∆cost. The obso-
lescence and, even more, the cost effect are key in explaining the stronger rise in WS-2
unemployment. The capitalization effect plays only a minor role. The cost effect captures
the deterioration of the unemployed human capital. Individuals remain unemployed for
22The level effect comes quite naturally and is common in this class of models. A higher b raises a
worker’s outside option and her share in the total surplus. The firm is compensated for the loss in surplus
through a higher vacancy filling rate q, which, in turn, implies a lower job finding rate p for the worker.
The compensation is necessary to make the zero-profit condition hold.
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longer in the WS-2 economy. With moderate technical change, this is not problematic
because human capital depreciates slowly. However, when technical change accelerates,
prolonged spells of unemployment lead to a substantial deterioration of the unemployed
human capital. This increases firms’ expected training costs, depresses job creation and
leads to a sharp decline in the equilibrium number of vacancies.
Table 5: Laissez-Faire and the Welfare-State Economies
1-z¯ 1-z¯u E(IJ ) v u
Decomposition
du gLP σwage∆obs. ∆cap. ∆cost
Panel(a): LF -Regime with b = 0.26 and pi = 0
7.0% 3.5% 1.33 2.53 5.59 13.5 1.4% 1.029
8.7% 4.9% 1.51 −12.9% +12.5%/0.7 4.6% −0.5% 8.4% 15.3 3.4% 1.038
Panel(b): WS1-Regime with b = 0.38 and pi = 0
7.0% 3.6% 1.34 2.09 6.60 16.1 1.4% 1.029
8.7% 5.2% 1.55 −15.8% +15.9%/1.05 5.9% −0.6% 10.6% 18.9 3.4% 1.038
Panel(c): WS2-Regime with b = 0.38 and pi = 0.4
8.7% 4.4% 2.02 1.47 8.98 22.5 1.1% 1.038
10.2% 6.7% 2.50 −27.6% +30.1%/2.71 10.4% −0.5% 20.2% 30.1 2.5% 1.047
1-z¯: Firms’ cutoff productivity, 1-z¯u: Average skill obsolescence of unemployed individuals, computed asP
z φ(z)(1− z), E(IJ ): Expected costs of training a new employee, v: Vacancy rate, u: Unemployment rate, ∆obs.
(∆cap.), [∆cost]: Percentage rise in unemployment due to obsolescence (capitalization), [cost] effect, du: Average
weekly duration of unemployment, gLP : Annualized aggregate labor productivity growth, σwage: Cross-sectional
wage dispersion measured by the 90-to-10 wage ratio. The first (second) row of each panel is for g = 2% (4%).
Finally, columns (10)-(11) in Table 5 report the results for two more macro-outcomes,
namely labor productivity growth and wage inequality. Labor productivity rises as g
increases. This occurs mechanically because productivity growth at the technology fron-
tier is the only driver of aggregate labor productivity. What is more interesting is that
labor productivity growth is substantially lower in the WS-2 economy than in the other
two cases. This difference is related to the slower technology updating in WS-2. When
upgrading is slack, each period, only a small fraction of existing firms adopts the leading
edge technology. These firms experience a jump in their productivity, whereas the pro-
ductivity of all other firms remains unchanged. Given the small fraction of up-graders,
their contribution to aggregate productivity growth is minimal.
In the model, wage inequality is generated by the vintage-induced productivity differ-
ences across firms. Firms with new and more productive technologies pay higher wages
than firms with older technologies that are less productive. The dispersion of productivity
across firms is generally wider than the dispersion of wages. The wage compression occurs
because workers in unproductive jobs can threaten to leave the firm for more productive
jobs. The wage inequality, measured by the 90/10 ratio, is very modest compared to what
is observed in the United States and in Europe. The model predicts that faster technical
change causes more wage inequality. When technical change increases, firms lower their
cutoff productivity z¯, which leads to a wider range of observed productivities in the econ-
omy and larger wage inequality. The rise in wage dispersion predicted by the model is
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less than 1% for all the three cases under consideration. This compares very poorly to
the observed rise in many industrialized economies over the last few decades. Obviously,
for this dimension of the data, our model has very little explanatory power.
Cross-Country Analysis
This section performs a cross-country analysis to explore how well the quantitative model
fits the observed unemployment dynamics for a set of 23 OECD countries. Countries are
considered to differ from one another along two dimensions: unemployment benefits b and
the policy distortion parameter pi. For each country, b is set equal to the 1960-1995 average
of unemployment benefits obtained from Nickell and Nunziata’s (2001) Labour Market
Institutions Database. The distortion parameter pi is calibrated for each country so that
the model matches the observed technology gap relative to the United States. The choice
of b does not affect firms’ technology choice, so all of the cross-country heterogeneity in
technology updating is captured by pi. The remaining parameters are left unchanged and
are considered to be the same across countries. Table 8 reports the calibrated values of b
and pi. The equilibrium for this calibration is called the initial steady-state of a country.
The experiment which is considered simulates, for each country separately, a permanent,
2-percentage point increase in the annual rate of technical change. The model’s success
is evaluated based on the extent to which the model can capture each country’s actual
change in labor market outcomes, specifically unemployment.
Obviously, the country-specific values b and pi generate an unemployment rate in the
initial steady-state that differs from what is observed in the data. This is a standard
problem in the literature, and it is addressed here by correcting for the higher initial
unemployment. More precisely, I follow the strategy of Hornstein et al. (2007) and re-
calibrate, for each country separately, the exogenous job separation rate ρ so that the
initial steady-state matches the country’s average unemployment rate over the 1956-2007
period as reported in Table 1)23.
The results of the quantitative exercise are concisely summarized in Table 6 and Figure 6.
Table 8 also reports the results of the quantitative model in which ρ was not re-calibrated
to match a country’s initial steady-state. The first two columns of Table 6 depict the
percentage-point change in the actual unemployment rate of a country that occurred
after the 1970s and the change predicted by the model. Panel (a) of Figure 6 provides
23Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2007) face the very same problem and introduce layoff taxes to cor-
rect for higher initial unemployment. This step would not work her. As emphasized by Mortensen and
Pissarides (1999) layoff taxes reduce the incentives to create jobs and to destroy them. The net effect on
unemployment turns out to be ambiguous. In this framework, a firing tax would inevitably raise unem-
ployment since, for the current calibration, endogenous job destruction is not performed in equilibrium.
The only source of job destruction is exogenous separations. Hence the channel through which firing
taxes could potentially lower unemployment, i.e. via locking workers into their jobs, does not take effect.
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a scatterplot of both series. The fit of the model is remarkable. Most of the country
observations are clustered closely around a hypothetical 45-degree line. For each country,
I compute how much of the actual unemployment change the model can explain and then
build the weighted average over all 23 country observations24. According to this measure
the model can explain, on average, 74% of the observed change in unemployment (see
Panel (a) of Table 6).
Table 6: Results of the Quantitative Model
Change in unemployment rate Duration gLPi /g
LP
USA
Data Model pii=0 bi=b¯ ρi=ρ¯ Data Model Data Model
United States 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 3.7 3.5 1.00 1.00
EU-15 2.9 2.4 0.9 0.8 0.7 10.7 8.3 0.57 0.64
EU-1 3.1 3.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 11.0 10.1 0.53 0.58
EU-2 1.6 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.7 8.9 5.1 0.71 0.94
Belgium 3.2 3.2 0.9 0.9 0.7 12.8 9.4 1.02 0.50
Finland 2.7 1.6 0.8 0.7 0.7 7.1 6.2 0.70 0.71
France 3.1 3.1 0.9 0.7 0.7 10.3 10.4 0.42 0.57
Germany 2.7 2.3 0.7 0.6 0.7 11.2 9.2 0.64 0.62
Greece 2.1 3.2 1.1 0.8 0.7 11.8 9.9 0.30 0.58
Ireland 2.1 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.7 11.9 4.3 0.45 0.89
Italy 2.6 2.5 0.9 0.9 0.7 13.1 7.4 0.52 0.58
Spain 6.4 5.1 1.9 1.4 0.7 11.3 10.7 0.41 0.64
Austria 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.7 6.9 4.7 0.60 0.83
Denmark 1.9 0.9 1.1 0.6 0.7 7.6 4.8 0.95 1.10
Luxembourg 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.7 8.8 4.8 0.92 1.06
Netherlands 2.1 1.8 0.8 0.6 0.7 11.0 8.1 0.61 0.73
Portugal 1.5 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.7 10.2 6.5 0.46 0.91
Sweden 1.6 1.4 0.7 0.5 0.7 6.4 7.4 0.85 0.96
United Kingdom 2.5 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 8.9 4.1 0.74 0.93
Australia 2.3 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 7.4 3.5 0.91 0.94
Canada 1.4 1.5 1.7 0.9 0.7 4.8 5.6 0.87 1.03
Japan 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 7.2 4.3 0.89 1.00
Norway 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.7 4.8 4.4 - 1.03
—— Panel (a): Change in unemployment rate ——
% Explained: 74% 38% 30% 30%
—— Panel (b): Change in dispersion of unemployment ——
σ56−06 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01
σ80−06 3.06 3.02 2.37 2.28 2.01
% Explained: 96% 34% 26% 0%
—— Panel (c): Duration of unemployment ——
% Explained (of level): 72% 46% 39% 38%
Dispersion σ 2.68 2.43 0.68 0.13 0.00
% Explained (of dispersion): 91% 26% 4% 0%
Model, (pii=0), [bi=b¯], {ρi=ρ¯}: Percentage-point change in unemployment rate in the calibrated benchmark
model (without technological heterogeneity), [and without institutional heterogeneity], {without any country
heterogeneity}, Duration: Average monthly duration of unemployment, gLPi /gLPUSA: Ratio of aggregate
annualized labor productivity growth in a given country i to labor productivity growth in the United States.
σ56−06 (σ80−06): Sample standard deviation of 1956-06 (1980-06) average unemployment rates.
A key observation of this paper is that unemployment has evolved very differently
across countries since the 1980s, which is reflected by a rising dispersion of unemployment
24The weighted average of the country-specific deviations is computed as∑23
i=1
(
1− |∆Datai −∆Modeli
∆Datai
|
)
ω(i) , where ω(i) = ∆Datai /
∑23
i ∆
Data
i is the weighting factor. ω is
taken so that more weight is put on countries which experienced a large unemployment change.
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rates across economies. Panel (b) of Table 6 reports the long-run standard deviation of
unemployment (denoted σ56−06) and documents that it increased substantially after the
1980s. The model captures this feature very well and can account for 95% of the actual
increase in the standard deviation. The implemented shock to technical change triggers a
relatively modest unemployment change in the United States, the EU-2 and some other
countries such as Canada or Japan, but a large change in the EU-1.
(a) Unemployment Change: Model vs. Data (b) Duration of and Change in Unemployment
(c) Labor Productivity Growth: Model vs. Data
Figure 6
The model also predicts the average duration of unemployment very well. As reported
in Panel (c), it matches, on average, 72% of a country’s actual duration, and 91% of
the dispersion in the entire sample. Moreover, the model is in line with the empirical
observation that, in most countries, the rise in unemployment was driven primarily by
a drop in the worker’s reemployment probability, leading to longer unemployment spells
(see Section 2). Panel (b) of Figure 6 depicts the model outcome for the average unem-
ployment duration and the change in the unemployment rate. The relation between the
two variables is broadly consistent with the empirical pattern found in Section 2.
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The last result concerns aggregate labor productivity growth. For each country, I
report the growth differential to the United States, computed as the ratio of labor pro-
ductivity growth in a given country to labor productivity growth in the United States25.
The actual and the predicted growth differentials are in Table 6 and are also depicted
in Panel (c) of Figure 6. Some countries exhibit a sizable productivity growth differen-
tial, whereas for others, the gap is negligible or even negative. The model does a good
job in explaining these differences. However, all observations are consistently above the
45-degrees line, which suggests that the selected empirical counterpart of productivity
growth is, arguably, a slightly imperfect proxy of what is captured by the model.
The Importance of Technological Heterogeneity
In the quantitative analysis, countries differ from one another along three dimensions: (1)
technology updating captured by pi, (2) institutions b, and (3) the rate of job separation
ρ. This section assesses the contribution of each source of heterogeneity in explaining the
results. To this end, I remove one dimension of heterogeneity after another and evaluate
the contribution of each dimension based on the extent to which the empirical fit of the
calibrated model changes.
The results of are reported in Columns (3)-(5) of Table 6. First, all cross-country dif-
ferences in technology upgrading are eliminated. This is achieved by setting the distortion
parameter pi equal to zero for all countries. Consequently, all firms in all countries face the
same costs of technology adoption and upgrading as firms in the United States. Shutting
down the technological heterogeneity worsens the empirical fit of the model considerably.
Only 38% of the observed country-specific unemployment changes are accounted for by
the model, which is about half of what the full model was able to explain. Moreover,
the model without technological heterogeneity can account for only 34% of the rise in
the cross-country dispersion of unemployment rates. The full model could match 96%,
suggesting that differences in technology updating costs is an important source of country
heterogeneity. Next, all institutional heterogeneity is eliminated by setting unemployment
income b equal to the U.S.-value of b¯=0.26. This further reduces the fit of the model,
but the quantitative effect is comparatively small compared to the effect triggered by the
removal of the technological differences. Finally, the rate of exogenous job separation ρ
is set equal to the U.S.-value of ρ¯=0.017169. All countries are now alike, and they all
exhibit the same increase in unemployment. Obviously, the model without heterogeneity
cannot explain any of the increase in cross-country unemployment dispersion.
25Actual aggregate labor productivity growth is affected by a variety of factors, many of which are
not a part of the model. To make the model outcome comparable with the data I decompose labor
productivity growth and focus only on the part which is driven by ICT-capital as this is most closely to
what is captured by the model. The data is taken from the Total Economy Growth Accounting Database
maintained by Groningen Growth and Development Centre.
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The previous analysis has shown that the observed cross-country differences in tech-
nology updating, captured by the underlying country-specific technology costs, are quan-
titatively important for explaining the different evolution of unemployment rates. Insti-
tutional differences are of lesser importance.
6 Robustness Checks
This section discusses three robustness checks of the quantitative model. First, the as-
sumption is relaxed that firms always install the state-of-the-art technology. Instead,
firms can endogenously choose their preferred technology. Second, alternative functional
forms are considered for the updating cost function, including linear and constant costs.
Third, in the spirit of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), turbulence is modeled explicitly by
introducing a probability of instantaneous skill depreciation after a job loss.
Check 1: Endogenizing the Technology Choice
The first check is motivated by the following concern. In the benchmark model, all new
firms are assumed to install the leading edge technology, irrespective of the skill level of the
new worker. This feature may artificially depress aggregate job creation. If the average
worker with whom a firm expects to match has obsolete skills, the firm incurs a large
cost to bring this worker to the frontier. This reduces a firm’s surplus and the number
of vacancies posted. If, instead, the firm can choose the technology, it may be optimal
to choose not the state-of-the-art technology but one that is less advanced and requires
less training. I now consider the case in which a firm optimally chooses the technology
after observing the new worker. The model is modified in two places to incorporate this
choice. First, the zero-profit condition is reformulated and now reads as follows:
κ = βg(1− σ)m(θ)θ−1
 ∑
z∈(0,1]
φ(z) max
z∗∈[z,1]
{
J¯(z∗)− IJ(z∗, z)}
 .
As before, z describes the productivity associated with the skill level of an unemployed
individual, and z∗ is the productivity level associated with the firm’s optimal choice. We
shall refer to z∗ as the targeted productivity. The total training costs are χ(z∗, z)=[1-
(z∗ − z)]−µ. The total costs and, therefore, the firm’s share IJ depend on the technology
gap the firm overcomes by upgrading the worker’s skills from z to z∗. For z∗=1, the model
is equivalent to the previous version without the technology choice. The technology choice
also applies to existing firms. That is, a firm that decides to upgrade can optimally choose
the vintage it wants to employ. The condition for upgrading now reads as follows:
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max
z∗∈[z,1]
{
J¯(z∗) + E¯(z∗)− χ(z∗, z)} > J¯(z) + E¯(z).
The focus here is on the decision of new firms rather than the upgrading decision of
existing firms26. Appendix B shows, in a simplified and analytically tractable framework,
that the optimal choice of z∗ is weakly increasing in the skills of the unemployed worker
z and satisfies z≤z∗≤1. More precisely, there are two values z0 and z1 for which:
z∗ :

z∗ = 1 if z ≥ z1
z∗ ∈ (z, 1) if z0 < z < z1
z∗ = z if z ≤ z0
These conditions indicate that a firm installs (a) the state-of-the-art technology if the
worker’s skills are sufficiently advanced and above z1, (b) a technology that is behind the
frontier but more advanced than the worker’s current skills if these are in (z0, z1), or (c)
the technology that exactly coincides with the worker’s current skill. The latter occurs
when the skills of the unemployed worker are more obsolete than z0. In the quantitative
model, these results are found to hold in exactly the same form.
Table 7: Results of Robustness Checks
Change in unemployment rate Unemployment dispersion Duration
USA EU15 EU1 EU2 %E σ56−06 σ80−06 %E Level σd %E
—— Panel (a): Data and benchmark model ——
Data 0.5 2.9 3.1 1.6 - 2.01 3.06 - - 2.68 -
Benchmark 0.7 2.4 3.3 0.9 74% 2.01 3.01 95% 71% 2.41 90%
—— Panel (b): Endogenous technology choice ——
ETC 0.7 2.7 3.7 0.9 74% 2.01 3.22 85% 72% 2.39 89%
—— Panel (c): Linear and constant costs ——
χlin 0.8 1.7 2.2 0.9 63% 2.01 2.65 61% 65% 1.60 60%
χcst 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 14% 2.01 2.13 12% 54% 1.28 48%
—— Panel (d): Turbulence shock ——
γ1% 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 12% 2.01 2.09 9% 42% 0.49 18%
γ5% 1.5 1.9 2.0 1.3 64% 2.01 2.39 37% 51% 0.69 26%
γ5%+pii 1.5 2.5 2.9 1.4 75% 2.01 2.88 83% 72% 1.88 70%
%E : Fraction of (full sample) data outcome explained by the model, σ56−06 (σ80−06): Standard dev. of 1956-06
(1980-06) average unemployment rates, σd: Standard dev. of unemployment duration. χlin (χcst): Linear (constant)
updating costs, γ1% (γ5%), [γ5%+pii]: Low (high) turbulence, [high turbulence and technological heterogeneity]
In the quantitative analysis, all structural parameters are taken to be the same as
those used in the benchmark model. This is possible because the inclusion of an endoge-
nous technology choice does not alter the initial steady-state of any of the countries under
consideration. In other words, the models with and without the technology choice are
observationally equivalent for g = 2%, and the calibration, therefore, remains unchanged.
26The reason being that upgrading to the frontier is optimal whenever upgrading is the optimal choice
(cf. the line of argument provided in footnote 12. ). Therefore, adding an explicit technology choice for
existing firms does not alter the results.
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As before, I consider the experiment of a 2 percentage point increase in g. The first four
columns of Table 7 report the induced change in the unemployment rate for the United
States, EU-15, EU-1 and EU-2. The fifth column shows the percentage fit of the quantita-
tive model for the entire sample of 23 countries. The remaining columns show the model
outcomes for the dispersion of unemployment rates and the duration of unemployment.
To facilitate comparability with previous results, Panel (a) of the same table states the
findings of the benchmark model and the data outcome.
Overall, the inclusion of the technology choice affects the results only marginally. For
the United States, the EU-15 and the EU-2 the results are virtually unchanged, as for
most of the countries in our sample. The exception are the countries belonging to EU-1.
For these countries, we observe a more pronounced increase in unemployment. It it worth
briefly examining why this is the case. Table 9 compares the models with and with-
out technology choice for the EU-1 and the EU-2 case. In the EU-1 countries, technology
adoption is more costly; therefore, upgrading is less frequent, and the average skills among
the unemployed are more obsolete (relative to the EU-2). In this environment, not all
newly hired workers are retrained to the frontier. Those with very obsolete skills receive
little or no training because it is optimal for the hiring firm to install a technology that
is closer to the worker’s current skill level instead of the frontier technology.
This scenario leads to three effects, two of which directly affect the job-creation decision
of firms. First, firms can expect lower training costs because not all workers receive the
full amount of training. Second, the average technology installed by a new firm is behind,
not at, the frontier and is therefore less productive than the leading-edge technology.
The first effect positively affects job creation because it raises the expected surplus of
a new job, whereas the second effect works in the opposite direction. The third effect
results from an increased incidence of job destruction. Technology updating on the job
is no longer optimal for all firms. Firms that began with a very obsolete technology
always find it too costly to upgrade. Their technology is kept in operation until the job
becomes unprofitable and is destroyed endogenously. In the framework studied previously,
endogenous job destruction never occurred in equilibrium. Here, it does occur, which
leads to a higher incidence of job separation and a correspondingly larger flow of workers
into unemployment. Each of the three effects is quantitatively substantial, as indicated
in Table 9. In sum, however, they almost cancel each other. Overall it seems that
an endogenous technology choice has only minor implications for the model’s aggregate
outcomes. For the given calibration, the findings of the benchmark model of Section 3
can be considered fairly robust with respect to the inclusion of a technology choice.
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Check 2: The Cost Function
The cost function χ used in Section 5 is mildly convex in the firm’s technology gap. Now,
I consider linear and constant costs. In both cases, I proceed by implementing the new
function into the model, re-recalibrating the model to the same targets as in the bench-
mark case and, finally, simulating the increase in the rate of technical change. The linear
cost function implemented here is given by χlin(z) = 1 +µlin(1− z), where the parameter
µlin is calibrated as before. The vertical intercept for z = 1 is the same as in the bench-
mark case and equal to 1. The constant cost function is simply χcst(z) = µcst.
Panel (c) of Table 7 reports the results for both specifications. Broadly speaking, the
findings change only moderately for the linear cost function. This is particularly true for
countries with a low distortion parameter pi, such as the United States and the EU-2. This
is explained by the fact that technology upgrading in these countries occurs at medium
and high values of z (close to 1). In this range, the calibrated value of µlin = 11.39
implies updating costs that are only slightly different from the benchmark case27. By
contrast, for countries belonging to the EU-1(which operate mostly at lower values of z),
the convexity of the original cost function is important to generate the large rise in un-
employment. Therefore, when using a linear function, the results change slightly. For the
entire sample, the fit of the model drops from 74% to 63%. More importantly, with linear
costs, the increase in unemployment is more uniform across countries. Consequently, the
model misses quite a bit of the observed increase in the dispersion of unemployment rates.
With constant costs, the results are very different. Panel (c) of Table 7 shows that the
empirical fit of the model drops drastically. In this scenario, an important channel of the
model is entirely disabled. We have found previously that faster technical change leads
to a higher rate of skill depreciation among unemployed workers, which translates into
higher expected training costs for the firm and discourages job creation. This is the cost
effect, which accounts for a substantial part of the unemployment increase. With constant
costs, this effect disappears because training costs are now the same for all workers. The
skill obsolescence of the unemployed worker is no longer relevant to the model. The
analysis of this section suggests that the convexity of upgrading costs is inessential for the
performance of the model. However, a very important feature is that costs are positively
related to the obsolescence of workers’ skills.
27In particular, in the benchmark the costs for upgrading after 2, 5 and 10 years amounted to 1.4, 2.1
and 4.5 months of output, respectively, In the case of linear costs this changes to 1.4, 2.1 and 3.1 months.
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Check 3: The Source of the Shock
Finally, I focus on the underlying exogenous shock. This section is motivated by the
previous literature, particularly by the influential work of Ljungqvist and Sargent. As an
explanation for the U.S.-EU unemployment pattern, this strand of analysis emphasizes
the interaction between an exogenous shock that is common to all countries and labor
market institutions that are country-specific. The shock considered in this literature rep-
resents a rise in the degree of economic turbulence, and it is modeled as an increase in the
likelihood that workers lose a fraction of their skills in the event of a job loss.
This paper considers a different type of common shock, the increase in the rate of
embodied technical change, and a different source of country heterogeneity, the costs of
technology adoption. The aim of this section is to explore the implications of introduc-
ing the turbulence shock instead of the technology shock into the current framework.
More precisely, the turbulence shock is introduced with institutional heterogeneity into
the model, but technical heterogeneity is disregarded. From this analysis, it can be deter-
mined whether the shock and the heterogeneity proposed in this paper are quantitatively
important or whether, instead, the model can explain the data equally well (or better)
with the features emphasized in the previous the literature.
There are several ways to incorporate the notion of turbulence into the model. The
way chosen here is closest to the approach by Ljungqvist and Sargent. In particular,
turbulence is associated with the likelihood that in the event of a job loss, a worker’s
production knowledge is hit by an obsolescence shock. Given this possibility, the value of
a job to a worker becomes:
E(z) = ω(z) + βg(1− σ)(1− ρ)E(z′) + βg(1− σ)ρ
∫ ∞
0
U(z/gt, z)dFγ(t)
where turbulence is encoded in t, which, for t>0, deteriorates a worker’s skills z after
a layoff. The larger t is, the higher the reduction of z. t is assumed to be drawn from an
exponential distribution with cdf Fγ(t)=1-e
−γt. The degree of turbulence is represented
by the parameter γ>0. For γ=+∞, it follows that dF (t)=0 for t>0, implying that there
is no turbulence and each worker maintains the same skill level after a job loss. For γ
being finite, dF (t)>0 for t>0. The distributional assumption implies that dF (t)>dF (t′)
for t<t′; that is, a small loss of skills is always more likely to occur than a large loss.
Following the literature, a worker’s unemployment income is assumed to be a fraction
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b of her wage earned prior to displacement. The value of unemployment reads as follows:
U(z, zl) = bω(zl) + βgp(θ)
[
E(1)− IE(z, zl)
]
+ βg(1− σ)(1− p(θ))U(z′, zl).
The state of an unemployed worker consists of the level of human capital prior to
displacement zl and the current human capital z. The former determines the benefit
payments, and the latter affects the amount of training required in a new job. This
setup nicely captures the key mechanism underlying Ljungqvist and Sargent’s approach.
Consider a worker who lost a job and was hit by the obsolescence shock such that z<zl.
This worker receives high unemployment benefits but is costly to retrain. As a result of
the high benefits, the worker has a valuable outside option when bargaining with a new
employer about wages and how to divide the training costs. Naturally, such a worker can
extract a higher share of the joint surplus than a similar worker with the same current
skill level z who was not hit by the shock (and so z=zl). When turbulence rises, more
workers lose their skills after a layoff. Thus, there is a higher proportion of unemployed
workers, who are costly to retrain and have strong bargaining power. Consequently, a
firm with an open position expects to obtain a lower surplus from hiring a new worker,
which, in turn, discourages job creation and increases unemployment.
The framework is used for the following analysis. First, the wage replacement rate b of
a country is chosen as in the quantitative analysis of Section 5, and pi is set equal to zero.
Turbulence is set to zero, and the initial steady-state is computed for each country. Then,
the turbulence shock is introduced, and the equilibrium is recomputed. Two different
scenarios are considered: low and high turbulence. In the low-turbulence case, γ=0.1634,
implying that all laid-off workers lose, on average, 1% of their skills28. In the high-
turbulence case γ=0.0314, implying an average skill loss of 5%. Figuratively speaking, a
loss of 1% and 5% imply that when the frontier grows at an annual rate of g=2%, a laid-
off worker falls further behind the frontier by about half a year and 2.5 years, respectively.
Panel (d) of Table 7 reports the results. A turbulence shock of 1% is clearly insufficient
to generate a rise in unemployment that is comparable with the observed rise. The model
can account for only 12% of what is observed. Furthermore, the predictions for other
labor market variables come nowhere near the actual outcomes. Considering a larger
shock size improves the empirical fit of the model, at least along certain dimensions. In
the high-turbulence case, the model generates a stronger increase in unemployment and
is, on average, more in line with the data. However, it fails to explain the rising unem-
ployment dispersion. As in previous setups of this type, the unemployment increase after
a turbulence shock depends on the wage replacement rate b. Unemployment rises only
28The average loss is computed as 1− ∫∞
0
1
gt dFγ(t) = 0.01.
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slightly when b is small, and it rises significantly when benefits are generous29.
The observed institutional heterogeneity is insufficient to explain the evolution of
OECD unemployment rates. The values of b are relatively uniform across OECD coun-
tries (see Column 8 of Table 8), meaning that the actual differences in wage replacement
rates are small. Not surprisingly, the quantitative contribution of these differences is mi-
nor and they can account for only 37% of the observed divergence of unemployment rates.
When technological heterogeneity is introduced into this framework (via the choice of pi),
the model does a much better job of explaining the data. The results are displayed in the
last row of Table 7. With technological heterogeneity, the model can account for 83% of
the divergence, which is considerably more than the previous 37%. Taken together, these
results, and also those of Section 5, suggest that labor market institutions (captured by b)
are unlikely to be the driving force behind the observed divergent labor market outcomes.
Rather, cross-country differences in technology usage mark the key source of heterogene-
ity to explain the observed patterns.
When considering technological heterogeneity, it appears that the model with the tur-
bulence shock is observationally very similar to the model with the technology shock (c.f.
the second and the last row of Table 7). This raises the question what type of shock
should be considered the relevant one. First, it must be noted that turbulence is an ab-
stract concept that is difficult to operationalize. No direct empirical evidence exists on its
occurrence; thus, it is impossible to identify the timing of the shock from observed data or
even to quantify the actual shock. Researchers have acknowledged these limitations and
relied on induction to characterize the shock. That is, they infer the existence and timing
of the turbulence shock from observing several economic outcomes that could potentially
be driven by a turbulence shock. For instance, Ljunqvist and Sargent (2007) interpret the
rise in individual earnings variability and higher industry and occupational mobility as
evidence in support of the hypothesis that turbulence has increased after the 1970s. Even
if one were to accept this way of identifying the shock, it is questionable whether it could
be used in a quantitative analysis. The lack of direct evidence leaves the researcher with
no guidance about how to incorporate the shock in a rigorous manner. Issues such as the
variable(s) in which the shock is encoded or the magnitude of the shock remain unresolved.
These matters are different in the case of a shock to embodied technical change. Sec-
tion 2 mentioned a large body of empirical literature that finds a significant acceleration
of embodied technical change in the 1970s. The identification typically relies on concepts
that are generally measurable in a reliable and well-defined way, such as the constant-
29The reason is that b determines the bargaining power of the worker and thereby determines by how
much the turbulence shock reduces the expected surplus of the firm.
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quality price index for investment goods used by Gordon (1990) and Cummins and Vi-
olante (2002). On closer inspection, the turbulence shock and the technology shock are
conceptually very similar; both lead to the deterioration of workers’ human capital after
a job separation. The turbulence shock exerts a direct effect because it reduces a worker’s
human capital stock by a given proportion. In contrast, the technology shock induces
faster growth of the technology frontier and indirectly leads to increased obsolescence of
the worker’s skills. Arguably, the technology shock works also through other channels.
However, the channel that involves skill obsolescence has been shown to be quantitatively
the most important. Considering this, it is reasonable to ask whether what the literature
has called turbulence shock is actually the result of the observed technology shock.
7 Conclusion
This paper uses a labor market matching model augmented with an endogenous technol-
ogy choice to explore the linkages between an economy’s technology adoption behavior,
labor market institutions and labor market outcomes. It analytically demonstrates that
the degree of obsolescence of an economy’s technological capital is a key determinant
for how the economy’s labor market, particularly the unemployment rate, reacts to an
acceleration in capital-embodied technical change. The quantitative part of the paper
considers a calibrated version of the model to study the implications of the rise in the
rate of embodied technical change after the 1970s for OECD labor markets. The main
result is that the observed cross-country differences in technology adoption and usage can
account for a large part of the different evolution of OECD unemployment rates since the
1970s. Countries with sizable technology gaps have generally experienced a severe deteri-
oration of labor market outcomes, unlike countries with high technology usage, in which
unemployment rates have risen only slightly. In contract to previous work, the framework
proposed here can explain (a) the divergence of unemployment rates between the major
European countries and the United States and (b) a large part of the observed variation
in unemployment rates across European economies. The technological heterogeneity is
found to be central for explaining cross-country differences in labor market outcomes.
This result of the paper challenges the popular, but controversial, hypothesis that blames
generous unemployment benefits for high unemployment in Europe. The analysis shows
that the observed institutional heterogeneity is insufficient to explain the diverse evo-
lution of unemployment rates. Moreover, many European welfare-state economies with
generous unemployment insurance systems have successfully maintained low rates of un-
employment. All of these economies have also had high technology adoption rates.
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A Continuous Time Representation of the Benchmark Model
This section presents the continuous-time version of the model. The first step derives
the firm’s value functions from its discrete-time counterpart. Consider a time interval of
length ∆ (with discrete time ∆=1) and use β= 1
1+r∆
to rewrite the firm’s value function:
J¯(τ) = ∆y(τ)−∆ω(τ) + 1
1 + r∆
(1 + g∆)(1− σ∆)(1− ρ∆)J¯(τ + ∆) (19)
Next, multiply both sides of (19) by 1+r∆, rearrange terms and divide by ∆. Then, let
∆→0 and define J¯ ′(τ)=lim∆→0 J¯(τ+∆)−J¯(τ)∆ to obtain the following differential equation:
(r − g)J¯(τ) = y(τ)− ω(τ)− (ρ+ σ)J¯(τ) + J¯ ′(τ) for τ < T (20)
where y(τ)=e−gτ and 0<g<1 is the growth rate, whereas before it was the growth
factor. An employed worker’s value function is derived in the same way and given by:
(r − g)E¯(τ) = ω(τ)− ρ [E¯(τ)− U]− σE¯(τ) + E¯ ′(τ) for τ < T (21)
The total surplus of a job S is defined as the sum of the surplus to the firm and the
surplus to the worker: S(τ)=J¯(τ)+E¯(τ)-U(τ). Using the value functions in (20) and (21),
S can be rewritten and is determined implicitly by the following differential equation:
−S ′(τ) + (r + ρ+ σ − g)S(τ) = e−gτ − (r + σ − g)U(τ)− U ′(τ)
Let T denote the optimal updating horizon, and use S = S(0). The solution to the
differential equation (evaluated at τ = 0) is:
S = max
T≥0
{∫ T
0
e−(r+ρ+σ−g)τ [y(τ)− (r + σ − g)U(τ)− U ′(τ)] dτ + e−(r+ρ+σ−g)TS(T )}
}
(22)
where S(T )=max{S-χ(T ), 0}. The condition r+ρ+σ-g>0 has to be satisfied to ensure
boundedness of the problem. Section 4 studies a simplified version of this model in which
σ is set to 0, the firms’ bargaining power η=1 and the firm is assumed to cover the
total training or updating costs χ. The latter implies that U(τ)=U , for all τ , and that
U ′(τ)=0. Furthermore, the model in Section 4 uses the relative productivity z as a firm’s
state variable, instead of the vintage τ . The switch of state variables is implemented by
the change of variables z=e−gτ (implying τ=− log(z)/g and gdτ=−dz/z) which yields
the equivalent to Equation (15) in the main text. The optimal cutoff productivity z¯ is
determined by the solution to the following equation (see Equation (17)):
1
g
∫ 1
z¯
z
r+ρ−g
g
−1 [z − z¯] dz = χ(z¯)
[
1 + χ,z
(
1− z¯ r+ρ−gg
) g
r + ρ− g
]
(23)
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The left-hand side is monotonously decreasing in z¯, and equal to 0 for z¯=1 and equal
to 1
r+ρ
for z¯=0. The right-hand side is decreasing in z¯, and equal to χ1 for z¯=1, and
equal to χ0 for z¯=0. The existence of an interior and unique z¯∈(0,1) requires the fol-
lowing two conditions to hold χ(0)< 1
r+ρ
and χ(1)>0. Furthermore, when z¯ is such that
z¯[1 + gχ′(z¯)]>b, technology updating is always optimal in equilibrium. When updating
is not optimal, that is when S-χ(T )<0 for all T≥0, the firm destroys the job when the
productivity has reached z¯=(r−g)U=b. The zero-profit condition stated in (18) is derived
from the asset equation for the value of a vacancy V :
(r − g)V = −κ+ p(θ)θ−1
∫ 1
0
[S − χ(z)] dΦz + V ′ (24)
Φz is the cumulative distribution of unemployed individuals over z. In equilibrium, all
gains from posting vacancies must be exhausted. This implies V=V ′=0 and Equation (24)
can be rearranged to yield Equation (18). The distribution function Φz is computed in a
two-step procedure. In the first step, the distributions of firms and unemployed workers
are computed over vintages τ , and in the second step, the necessary change of variables
z=e−gτ is implemented. For tractability, the two-step approach is preferable over the
direct computation of Φz. Let by m0 denote the mass of firms at the frontier, composed
of newly created firms and those which update. Exogenous destruction is the only source of
job separation. Therefore, the mass of firms for any τ∈[0, T] is f(τ)=m0e−ρτ , and f(τ)=0
for all τ>T . The mass of unemployed at the frontier is u(0)=ρf(0). For any τ∈[0,T], the
law of motion of u is u˙(τ)=ρf(τ)-pu(τ). The change in the stock of unemployed with τ
is given as the difference between the inflow, i.e. destroyed jobs with τ , and the outflow
that is determined by new matches. Using f(τ)=m0e
−ρτ the law of motion can be written
as u˙(τ)=ρm0e
−ρτ -pu(τ), which, after integrating, yields:
u(τ) =
ρm0
p− ρ
[
e−ρτ − (1 + ρ− p)e−pτ]
For all τ∈(T,∞) there is no further inflow into unemployment since f(τ)=0, ∀τ>T .
The law of motion for unemployed with τ>T can be written as u˙(τ)=−pu(τ) which yields
u∗(τ)=u(T )e−p(τ−T ). The total mass of the unemployed U=
∫ T
0
u(τ)dτ+
∫∞
T
u∗(τ)dτ is used
to compute the density φ(τ)=u(τ)/U for τ∈[0, T ] and φ∗(τ)=u∗(τ)/U for τ=(T,∞):
φ(τ) =
pρ
p− ρ
[
e−ρτ − (1 + ρ− p)e−pτ
1 + ρ− e−ρT
]
for τ ∈ [0, T ]
φ∗(τ) = φ(T )e−p(τ−T ) for τ ∈ (T,∞)
The change of variables z=e−gτ implying τ=− log(z)/g and gdτ=−dz/z gives:
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φ(z) =
pρ
(p− ρ)g
[
zρ/g−1 − (1 + ρ− p)zp/g−1
1 + ρ− z¯ρ/g
]
for z ∈ [z¯, 1]
φ∗(z) = φ(z¯) (z/z¯)p/g−1 for z ∈ (0, z¯)
B Robustness Check
The extension in Section 6 allows firms to endogenously choose the production technology
after matching with a worker. In the simplified continuous-time version of the model, this
extensions leads to the following modified free entry condition:
κ = p(θ)θ−1
∫ 1
0
max
z∗∈[z,1]
{S(z∗)− χ(z∗, z)} dΦz
The element of interest is z∗ which is chosen by the firm to maximize the surplus, given
the skill level of the new worker z. That is z∗ = arg max {S(z∗)− χ(z∗, z)}. Using the
expression for the surplus function S(z∗) this leads to the following optimality condition30:
1
gz∗
[z∗ − b− (r + ρ− g)S(z∗)] R ∂χ(z∗, z)/∂z
For a given z, S and χ are (weakly) increasing in z∗. Therefore, corner solutions
are possible leading to the 3 cases for the optimal z∗ as stated in the text. When the
condition above holds for all z∗ with >, then z∗=1. In this case, the surplus S rises by
more than the costs, therefore the maximum surplus is obtained at the upper bound z∗=1
(provided that S>χ(1, z)). When the opposite holds, that is costs are rising more than
the surplus, then the optimum is attained at lowest possible value of z∗, which is z∗=z.
The third case is given when the condition above holds with equality, implying that there
is an intermediate value of z<z∗<1 for which the maximum surplus value is attained. As
a result, the optimal choice z∗ is weakly increasing in the new worker’s skill level z.
C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is established by showing that the right-hand side
and the left-hand side of Equation (17) are, respectively, increasing and decreasing in
g. This implies that the z¯ for which Equation (17) holds with equality, is decreasing in
g. Let ΓR denote the right-hand side of Equation (17) and define γ=
r+ρ−g
g
. Therefore,
30To preserve tractability, the possibility of future technology updating is not considered here. Conse-
quently, the term for S(z¯) drops from the surplus equation. This certainly leads to a loss of generality,
but for the current purpose it is acceptable as the main focus here is on a firm’s technology choice after
matching with a worker. It is likely that the relevant trade-offs concerning this choice remain largely
unaffected by this simplification.
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ΓR=χ(z¯)+z¯χ
′(z¯)
[
1−z¯γ
γ
]
from which it follows that ∂ΓR/∂γ =
z¯χ′(z¯)
γ2
[z¯γ (1− γ log z¯)− 1].
The term in square brackets [z¯γ (1− γ log z¯)− 1]=0 for z¯=1, and (by L’Hopital’s rule)
limz¯→0
1−γ log z¯
z¯−γ -1=-1. Moreover, the term is increasing for z¯∈(0,1] since ∂∂z¯ z¯γ (1− γ log z¯)
=−γ2z¯γ−1 log(z¯)≥0 from which it follows that ∂ΓR/∂γ≤0 (with = 0 for z¯=1), and since
∂ΓR/∂g =∂ΓR/∂γ× ∂γ/∂g and ∂γ/∂g<0 one can establish ∂ΓR/∂g≥0 (with = 0 for z¯ =
1). Let ΓL denote the left-hand side of Equation (17) so that ΓL=
1
g
∫ 1
z¯
z
r+ρ
g
−1 [1− z¯
z
]
dz.
For z¯=1 it follows that ΓL=0, and for z¯=0, ΓL=
1
r+ρ
. Both endpoints are independent of
g. To evaluate the change of ΓL for z¯∈(0,1), build: ∂ΓL∂g =− 1g2
∫ 1
z¯
(1+ r+ρ
g
log(z))z
r+ρ
g
−1[1-
z¯
z
]dz. The term under the integral (1+ r+ρ
g
log(z))z
r+ρ
g
−1 [1− z¯
z
]
is equal to 0 for z = z¯,
and equal to 1− z¯ > 0 for z = 1. Simple inspection reveals that the term is increasing in
z as all the three terms, that involve z increase as z goes up). From that it follows that
integral is positive for all z¯ ∈ (0, 1) and thus ∂ΓL
∂g
≤ 0, with = for z¯ = 0 and z¯ = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The critical productivity z¯ is determined by the updating costs χ
and, thus Njob= z¯−b+z¯gχ′(z¯)r+ρ−g can be considered as a function of χ. Here, only those values of
χ are considered for which technology updating is optimal, that is χ∈[0, χ¯] where χ¯ solves
Njob=0 ⇐⇒ z¯(1+gχ¯′)=b. For χ=0, it follows that z¯=1, and thus Njob|χ=0= 1−br+ρ−g>0.
An increase in g moves the vertical intercept Njob|χ=0 upwards, whereas the horizontal
intercept Njob|χ=χ¯ is shifted inwards. The image of Njob is rotated counter-clock-wise
implying that an increase in g leads to a rise (fall) in Njob if χ is sufficiently low (high).
Moreover, there is a unique value of χ for which the net surplus does not change at all.
D Data
D.1 Hours Worked: Data Series and Sources
I follow the literature and compute total annual hours worked per person by, first, mul-
tiplying annual hours worker per worker with the number of persons employed, and
then dividing the product by the total population aged 15-64 years. The data on an-
nual hours worker per worker and persons employed is obtained from the Total Economy
Database published by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre. The data can
be downloaded from http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/ The two
series used here are labeled ”Hours” and ”Emp”. The data on total population aged 15-64
years is obtained from the Annual Labour Force Statistics database maintained by the
OECD and can be downloaded from http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx
D.2 Hours worked: Counterfactual
Here I explain how to compute the hypothetical hours worked per person in country i
at time t that would have prevailed if the unemployment to population ratio in country
i (denoted
Ui,t
Pi,t
) had evolved like that in the United States. First, pick a reference year
52
relative to which changes in the ratio Ui,t/Pi,t are measured. The reference year used
here is 1970. Second, compute ∆i,t =
Ui,t
Pi,t
− Ui,70
Pi,70
, which measures by how much the
unemployment to population ratio of country i is different in year t than in 1970. For
instance, in the case of the EU-15, the ratio rises from 0.0148 in 1970 to 0.0713 in 1995,
implying that ∆EU15,95 = 0.0565. Third, compute the same statistic for the United
States: ∆USA,t, For instance, for t =1995 we get ∆USA,95 = 0.0103. By comparing ∆i,t
and ∆USA,t, one can infer how much more country i’s unemployment to population ratio
has rises (fallen) from 1970 to t relative to the United States. The relative increase in the
EU-15 in 1995 amounts to 0.0462. Fourth, determine how high unemployed in country
i at time t would have to be, so that the change in the unemployment to population
ratio were the same as in the United States. That is, compute the hypothetical number
of unemployed (denoted U∗i,t) for which
U∗i,t
Pi,t
=
Ui,t
Pi,t
− (∆i,t −∆USA,t). Fifth, compare this
number to the actual number of unemployed: U∗i,t−Ui,t from which we learn by how much
the number of unemployment individuals would have to decline (rise) to offset the larger
rise (fall) in the unemployment to population ratio in country i relative to the United
States. Continuing the previous example: U∗EU15,95 - UEU15,95 = -11,476,820 meaning
that in the EU-15 (in 1995) unemployment would have to decline by around 11.5 million.
Finally, ask the hypothetical question how would total hours worked per person in country
i at time t have looked like, if these additional unemployed individuals were all employed
and had worked the same hours like an average worker in i at time t. Let THi,t and
TH∗i,t denote the actual and the hypothetical total hours worked and AHi,t denote the
average hours worked per worker. Compute the hypothetical hours worked per person as
TH∗i,t
Pi,t
=
THi,t−AHi,t(U∗i,t−Ui,t)
Pi,t
. For the EU-15
TH∗EU15,95
PEU15,95
is equal to 1122.6 hours.
D.3 Computing the Technology Gap
This section outlines the approach which is used to compute the average age of ICT capital
for each of the countries in the sample. The data is taken from the 2009 release of the EU
KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, and in particular from the ”Capital Input
Files”. In the first step, a perpetual investment method is used to construct a series of
the ICT capital stock. Let i indicate a given country and let KICTi,t denote the ICT capital
stock of country i at time t which is computed as KICTi,t =
∑t
s=1(1− δICTi )s−1IICTi,s . δICTi
is the ICT capital depreciation rate which is taken to be country-specific but constant
over time, and IICTi,s denotes aggregate real gross fixed capital formation of ICT assets at
time s ≤ t. In the original data set IICTi,s is labeled as ”Iq ICT” and the base year for the
price index is the year 1995.
The observations on IICTi,s range from s = 1970, 1971, ..., 2007 (this is different for
some countries as reported below), therefore one can construct the following sequence of
capital stocks
{
KICTi,t
}2007
t=1970
. With geometric depreciation, only a fraction (1 − δICTi )t−s
of the period s ≤ t investment is still undepreciated at time t and part of the time t
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capital stock. Let φi,s,t denote the fraction of time s investment in the period t capital
stock. It is computed as φi,s,t =
(1−δICTi )t−sIICTi,s
KICTi,t
, with
∑t
s=1 φi,s,t = 1. The average age
of ICT capital at time t is denoted ageICTi,t . Using the elements from above it can be
straightforwardly computed as ageICTi,t =
∑t
s=1 φi,s,t [t− (s− 1)]. Country i’s technology
gap (as reported in Table 1) to the United States is then expressed as the percentage
difference between the average age of ICT capital in country i and of that in the United
States: Gapi = 100×
(
ageICTi /age
ICT
USA − 1
)
.
The use of the perpetual investment method implies that the capital stock, and there-
fore also the age of capital, are not accurately measured for the first few time periods of
the sample. This has to be taken into account and is solved by cutting off an initial period
of a certain length. Due to high values of δICTi , this period can be kept relatively short as
the time series of ageICTi,t stabilizes already after only a few periods. For some countries
this takes slightly longer than for other countries, therefore, the number of periods which
are cut off can differ across countries. Column 1 of Table 8 reports the time period for
each country in the sample over which the data on IICT is available, and Column 2 of the
same table reports the final number of periods (= total - initial cutoff) over which the
average age of capital ageICTi,t is computed.
The rate of ICT-capital depreciation δICTi is taken to be country specific. I do not
make use of the depreciation rates provided by the EU-KLEMS since these are all identi-
cal across countries and are, therefore, not suited for our purpose. The concept of capital
depreciation as it is considered here, is analogous to the definition of the BEA which de-
scribes depreciation as ”the decline in value due to wear and tear, obsolescence, accidental
damage, and aging” and it is thus a combination of physical decay and obsolescence. The
degree of ”wear and tear” is unlikely to be the same across countries and consequently I
refrain from using the depreciation rates of the EU-KLEMS. Instead, δICTi is constructed
for each country separately. The approach which is used builds on the notion that the
rate of depreciation should be related to the degree of utilization of the capital. Capital
that is intensely used is likely to wear out more quickly and is subject to a higher rate of
depreciation.
There is no comprehensive data available on the utilization of ICT capital. Thus I use
a proxy which is taken to be the ratio of ICT-capital services (denoted SICTi,t ) to the ICT-
capital stock. The idea behind this concept is that the amount of services produced by
a given amount of capital should be related to how intensely the capital stock is utilized.
The data for the capital stock is taken from the EU-KLEMS data base, and given by the
series for the real fixed ICT-capital stock (computed for 1995 prices). To compute capital
services, the reported series for ICT-capital services per hour worked is multiplied by the
reported number of total hours worked. The rate of capital depreciation for country i is
then computed as δICTi =
1
T
∑T
t=1
SICTi,t
KICTi,t
.
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The results obtained from this procedure are reported in Table 8. The literature
generally lacks empirical estimates of ICT-depreciation rates to which one could compare
these numbers. Luckily, however, there exist good estimates for the rate of depreciation
of physical (non-ICT) capital31. The annual rate of physical capital depreciation in the
United States is typically found to be the interval from 0.09− 0.14. To get a sense of how
the proposed proxy compares to these estimates, I also compute the rate of depreciation
of non-ICT capital. These results are reported in Column 4 of Table 8. The rate for the
United States is found to be 0.122 which lies in the aforementioned interval. This makes
me confident that also the proxy for ICT-capital depreciation is, in fact, a good measure
of the actual depreciation rate.
E Tables
Table 8: Supplementary Information, Data and Results
Period Yrs Depreciation Technology Gap bi pii % Unemployment Change
δICTi δi 80-95 95-07 78-07 Data Model pii=0 bi=b¯
USA 1970-07 30 0.461 0.122 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.26 0.00 9.1 12.5 12.5 12.5
EU-15 25.7 25.6 25.3 0.38 0.64 44.7 30.1 15.9 12.5
EU-1 35.9 34.5 33.7 0.39 0.75 45.3 37.4 16.3 12.5
EU-2 7.4 5.8 6.5 0.38 0.21 37.7 18.7 15.8 12.5
BE 1980-04∗∗ 20 0.324 32.7 49.2 35.4 0.31 0.92 45.8 28.3 13.6 12.5
FIN 1970-07 20 0.375 0.081 19.4 21.7 20.1 0.32 0.52 46.1 24.9 13.9 12.5
F 1980-04∗∗ 10 0.364 30.1 30.2 0.40 0.77 52.3 46.0 16.7 12.5
GER 1970-07 30 0.374 0.082 24.9 23.1 23.7 0.39 0.70 53.9 33.5 16.4 12.5
GRE 1980-04∗∗ 10 0.315 28.8 28.8 0.39 0.74 31.4 37.1 16.1 12.5
IRE 1980-04∗∗ 20 0.492 2.2 -4.9 -0.6 0.37 0.04 23.8 14.4 15.3 12.5
ITA 1970-07 30 0.260 0.085 57.4 60.5 57.7 0.29 0.73 33.8 35.1 13.1 12.5
ESP 1970-07 30 0.352 0.087 27.9 25.8 27.4 0.44 0.59 63.9 49.3 18.2 12.5
AUT 1976-07 30 0.398 0.077 13.5 11.5 11.3 0.27 0.38 27.5 17.7 12.7 12.5
DK 1970-07 30 0.493 0.067 -9.2 -7.7 -8.6 0.51 -0.13 34.7 16.1 22.9 12.5
LUX 1980-04∗∗ 20 0.315 0.39 0.15 15.8 15.9 15.9 12.5
NED 1970-07 35 0.381 0.077 17.4 15.3 15.9 0.43 0.52 47.0 28.4 18.1 12.5
POR 1980-04 13 0.439 0.133 6.5 10.0 8.4 0.46 0.26 28.4 26.3 19.6 12.5
SWE 1993-07 10 0.439 0.138 7.6 7.7 0.48 0.32 43.4 27.8 20.5 12.5
UK 1970-07 30 0.434 0.094 6.1 4.6 5.8 0.29 0.14 47.1 15.4 13.2 12.5
AUS 1970-07 30 0.433 4.8 -0.7 3.1 0.21 0.09 43.6 12.7 11.6 12.5
CAN 1980-04∗ 30 0.456 0.082 -4.4 1.5 -4.3 0.52 -0.05 18.7 19.3 23.8 12.5
JPN 1970-06 30 0.461 0.122 -2.4 7.4 2.0 0.32 0.17 31.8 14.8 14.1 12.5
NOR + 0.36 0.14 43.8 15.0 15.1 12.5
Note: ∗ The data for these countries is taken from the 2008 release of the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity
Accounts. ∗∗ The data for these countries is taken from Total Economy Growth Accounting Database maintained by
the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (The EU KLEMS does not provide capital data for these countries).
+ No ICT-capital data is available for Norway. The average age of ICT capital is assumed to be the same as in the
United States, Period : Time interval for which ICT data is available, Yrs: Number of most recent observations used to
compute the capital age, δICTi (δi): Depreciation rate of (non) ICT-capital, 80-95 (95-07) [78-07]: Technology gap to
the United States in period 1980-95 (1995-2007) [1978-2007], bi: 1960-1995 average of first year unemployment benefits
measured in terms of the percentage of average pre-tax earnings, pii: Distortion parameter affecting technology
adoption costs, Model (pii=0) [bi=b¯]: Percentage change in unemployment rate in the calibrated benchmark model
(without technological heterogeneity), [and without institutional heterogeneity]. Notice: In this version of the model ρ
was not re-calibrated to match a country’s initial steady-state.
31See Epstein and Denny (1980), Bischoff and Kokkelenberg (1987) and Nadiri and Prucha (1996).
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Table 9: Endogenous Technology Choice: EU-1 vs EU-2
1-z¯ 1-zu 1-z0 E(J) E(IJ ) jdest u ∆u ∆I ∆II ∆III
—— Panel (a): EU-1 ——
BM/ETC g = 2% 8.5% 4.9% 0.0% 2.9 2.6 0.0% 6.6
BM g = 4% 9.9% 8.1% 0.0% 3.8 3.6 0.0% 9.9 +3.3
+0.856 +0.578 -1.005
ETC g = 4% 9.9% 10.5% 3.4% 3.4 3.3 6.3% 10.4 +3.8
—— Panel (b): EU-2 ——
BM/ETC g = 2% 7.0% 3.9% 0.0% 2.1 1.7 0.0% 4.3
BM g = 4% 8.7% 5.7% 0.0% 2.3 1.9 0.0% 5.2 +0.9
+0.008 +0.006 -0.008
ETC g = 4% 8.7% 5.8% 0.1% 2.3 2.0 0.2% 5.2 +0.9
Note: The initial steady-state for g = 2% is the same for BM and ETC, BM: Benchmark model, ETC: Model with
endogenous technology choice, g: Annualized growth rate of technology frontier, 1-z¯: Firms’ cutoff productivity, 1-z¯u:
Average skill obsolescence of unemployed individuals, 1-z0: Average technology gap of newly created jobs, E(IJ ):
Expected costs of training a new employee, E(J): Expected costs of training a new employee, jdest: Fraction of
existing jobs that will be endogenously destroyed, u: Unemployment rate, ∆u: Percentage-point change in
unemployment when g = 2%→ 4%, ∆I (∆II) [∆III ]: Additional percentage-point increase of u in the ETC case
relative to the BM case due to lower expected surplus (higher endogenous job destruction), [lower expected costs].
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